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THE OBSCENITY TERMS OF THE COURT
0. JOHN ROGGEt
I.

OVERVIEW OF THE

1970-1971 SUPREME COURT

OBSCENITY DECISIONS

AT ITS OCTOBER

1970-JUNE 1971 TERM, the Supreme Court
of the United States had the incredible number of 61 obscenity cases
on its docket,' if one includes two cases which involved the use of the
four-letter word for the sexual act, in the one case by itself,' and in
the other instance with the further social message that this is what one
should do with the draft.' These are more such cases than at any
previous term, or number of terms for that matter. No less than five
of the 61 cases involved the film, I Am Curious (Yellow). Other cases
involved such varied forms of expression and entertainment as the following: Language of Love, a Swedish sex education film which contains explicit scenes of sexual intercourse; Hair, a rock musical with
some fullfront mass nudity; sculptor Mark Morell's representation
of the American flag as a phallus; Candy, A Woman's Urge, and Man
and Wife, films; Whiplash Lovers, a magazine; Eros, a quarterly;
Liaison, a newsletter; Housewife's Handbook on Selective Promiscuity,
a book; stag movies; photographs for use in a book describing sexual
positions; nudes displaying female genitalia; and the disrobing at a
public meeting in a lounge of one of the student resident halls of
Grinnell College, Iowa, by eight young women as a protest against
Playboy magazine's use of nude females for commercial purposes.
In the first six of the 61 cases the Supreme Court listened to over
six hours of argument during November 1970. In three of those cases,
t Member of the New York Bar. A.B., University of Illinois, 1922; LL.B.,
Harvard University, 1925; S.J.D., 1931.
1. A complete list of all obscenity cases on the Court's 1970-1971 docket may be
found in Appendix I infra.

2. People v. Hoffman, 45 Ill. 2d 221, 258 N.E.2d 326, cert. denied, 400 U.S.
904 (1970).
3. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), rev'g 1 Cal. App. 3d 94, 81 Cal. Rptr.
503 (1969).

(393)
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the Court had heard argument at its 1969-1970 term, but instead of
deciding the cases, restored them to the calendar for reargument at its
1970-1971 term. Thus, these six cases alone consumed more than
two full days of arguments.
In three of the first six obscenity cases, Dyson v. Stein, 4 Perez v.
Ledesma,5 and Byrne v. Karalexis,6 as well as three sedition cases,
Younger v. Harris,' Samuels v. Mackell,8 and Fernandez v. Mackell,9
and a case involving an Illinois intimidation statute, Boyle v. Landry,"
the Court invoked the doctrine of abstention," ordering counsel to
raise their federal constitutional points in state court trials, unless
there were "extraordinary circumstances,' 2 or the threat of "irreparable injury,"'" or the danger of suffering "irreparable damages."'" In
these cases, relief from state prosecutions had been sought in threejudge federal district courts. Later in the term, the Court gave similar advice in six more of the 61 obscenity cases on its 1970-1971
docket.'
Two of the first six obscenity cases involved the film I Am Curious
(Yellow). One of these cases was Byrne v. Karalexis. The other was
Grove Press v. Maryland State Board of Censors,6 where the Court,
4. 401 U.S. 200 (1971), vacating and remanding to 300 F. Supp. 602 (N.D.
Tex. 1969).
5.401 U.S. 82 (1971), rev'g in part, vacating and remanding in part to Delta
Book Distrib., Inc. v. Cronvich, 304 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. La. 1969).
6. 401 U.S. 216 (1971), vacating and remanding to 306 F. Supp. 1363 (D.
Mass. 1969).
7. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
8. 401 U.S. 66 (1971).

9. 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
10. 401 U.S. 77 (1971).
11. For an excellent discussion of the effects of these cases and the rejuvenation
of the abstention doctrine, see Teeter & Pember, Obscenity, 1971: The Rejuvenation
of State Power and the Return to Roth, 17 VILL. L. REv. 211 (1971).
12. Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 85 (1971), rev'g in part, vacating and remanding in part to Delta Book Distrib., Inc. v. Cronvich, 304 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. La. 1969);
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53 (1971).
13. Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216, 219, 220 (1971), vacating and remanding to
306 F. Supp. 1363 (D. Mass. 1969); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200, 203 (1971),
vacating and remanding to 300 F. Supp. 602 (N.D. Tex. 1969) ; Perez v. Ledesma,
401 U.S. 82, 85 (1971), rev'g in part, vacating and remanding in part to Delta Book
Distrib., Inc. v. Cronvich, 304 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. La. 1969); Boyle v. Landry, 401
U.S. 77, 80, 81 (1971) ; Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 68, 69 (1971) ; Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44, 46, 48, 53 (1971).
14. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971).
15. Ferndon v. Demich, 401 U.S. 990 (1971), vacating and remanding to 426
F.2d 643 (9th Cir. 1970) ; ABC Books, Inc. v. Benson, 401 U.S. 988 (1971), vacating
and remanding to 315 F. Supp. 695 (M.D. Tenn. 1970) ; Hosey v. City of Jackson,
401 U.S. 987 (1971), vacating and remanding to 309 F. Supp. 527 (S.D. Miss. 1970) ;
McGrew v. City of Jackson, 401 U.S. 987 (1971), vacating and remanding to 307 F.
Supp. 754 (S.D. Miss. 1969) ; Johnnie Reb's Book & Card Shop v. Slaton, 401 U.S.
985 (1971), affg 226 Ga. 171, 175 S.E.2d 539 (1970) ; Van Hoomissen v. Hayse, 403
U.S. 927 (1971), vacating and remanding to 321 F. Supp. 642 (D. Ore. 1970).
16. 401 U.S. 480 (1971), aff'g by an evenly divided Court 255 Md.297, 258 A.2d
240 (1969) (Douglas, J., not participating).
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evenly divided, affirmed an obscenity holding of a state court, Justice
Douglas not participating.
The three-judge federal district court in Karalexis v. ByrneT
8 where the
applied Stanley v. Georgia,"
Court held that an individual
had a right to the private possession of pornography, and ruled by a
two to one vote that a theatre owner had a right to show the film I Am
Curious (Yellow) to paying adults. Circuit Judge Bailey Aldrich
wrote for the court: "If a rich Stanley can view a film, or read a book,
in his home, a poorer Stanley should be free to visit a protected theatre
or library. We see no reason for saying he must go alone."'" The
Supreme Court, however, vacated the judgment.
In the remaining two of the first six obscenity cases, Blount v.
Rizzi, 20 and United States v. Book Bin,2 the Court held that sections

4006 and 4007 of title 39 of the United States Code, now sections
3006 and 3007 of the Postal Reorganization Act, s providing for a
mail block, constituted prior restraints contrary to Freedman v. Maryland,23 and were therefore unconstitutional.
In addition to Grove Press v. Maryland State Board of Censors,24
the Court, evenly divided, Justice Douglas not participating, sustained
opposing holdings of the lower courts in two other instances. In
Radich v. New York, 25 the Court sustained an art dealer's conviction
for displaying sculptor Mark Morell's representation of the American
flag as a phallus, while in Californiav. Pinkus,2 6 it let stand the Ninth
Circuit's ruling that a stag movie of a woman who disrobed and feigned
some sort of sexual satisfaction from self-induced acts was not obscene.
The Court continued to reverse obscenity convictions simply by
citing Redrup v. New York,27 a case which became the password, as
it were, for such reversals. To date, if one includes the two cases decided with Redrup, there have been a total of 32 cases in which the
Court in per curiam decisions reversed obscenity holdings simply on
2
the basis of that cases.
There were two Redrup rulings at the 197017. 306 F. Supp. 1363 (D. Mass. 1969), vacated and remanded, 401 U.S. 216

(1971).

18. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
19. 306 F. Supp. at 1367.
20. 400 U.S. 410 (1971), aff'g 305 F. Supp. 634 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
21. 400 U.S. 410, aff'g 306 F. Supp. 1023 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
22. 39 U.S.C.A. §§ 3006, 3007 (Supp. 1971).
23. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
24. 401 U.S. 480 (1971), aff'g by an evenly divided Court 255 Md.297, 258 A.2d
240 (1969) (Douglas, J., not participating).
25. 401 U.S. 531 (1971), aff'g by an evenly divided Court 26 N.Y.2d 114, 257
N.E.2d 30, 308 N.Y.S.2d 846 (1970) (Douglas, J., not participating).
26. 400 U.S. 922 (1970), aff'g by an evenly divided Court 429 F.2d 416 (9th Cir.
1970) (Douglas, J., not participating).
27. 386 U.S. 767 (1967).
28. The Redrup rulings are listed in Appendix II infra.
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1971 term: Childs v. Oregon" and Bloss v. Michigan."

In the first

case, Lesbian Roommate, a paperback, and in the second, A Woman's
Urge, a film, were both held not to be obscene. There are two obscenity
cases entitled Childs v. Oregon."l Both involved the same individual
and the same item, but the results were different. More than in any
other constitutional area, the results in obscenity contests are a toss-up.
The results in the two cases involving the use of the four-letter
word for the sexual act also point in opposite directions. In the case
where the word was used by itself, Hoffman v. Illinois,82 involving
Abbie Hoffman, the Yippie leader, the Court denied review and let
stand a judgment of conviction for resisting arrest. However, in the
other, Cohen v. California,83 the Court held that the language used
was protected speech under the first and fourteenth amendments. The
Court added that this was not "an obscenity case," for the challenged
language "must be, in some significant way, erotic." '
In Byrne v. P.B.I.C., Inc., 88 which involved Hair, a rock musical
with some fullfront mass nudity, the Court vacated a judgment in the
musical's favor, and remanded the case for a consideration of the question of mootness 6
By denying certiorari in Keriakos v. Hunt, 7 the Court let stand
a First Circuit ruling that magazines emphasizing female genitalia are
not obscene. 88 However, the Court has also taken the opposite tack in
refusing to review several lower court obscenity convictions. 9
Ralph Ginzburg, publisher of the quarterly Eros and, later, of the
magazine Fact, was before the Court for a second time on a petition
for certiorari. The offenses and the items were the same: an issue
of Eros, a newsletter called Liaison and a book, Housewife's Hand29. 401 U.S. 1006 (1971), rev'g 431 F.2d 272 (9th Cir. 1970).
30. 402 U.S. 938 (1971), rev'g 18 Mich. App. 410, 171 N.W.2d 455 (1969).
31. The other is reported at 394 U.S. 931 (1969), denying cert. to 252 Ore. 91,
447 P.2d 304 (1968). It is listed in Appendix IV infra.
32. 400 U.S. 904, denying cert. to 45 111. 2d 221, 258 N.E.2d 326 (1970).
33. 403 U.S. 15 (1971), rev'g 1 Cal. App. 3d 94, 81 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1969).
34. 403 U.S. at 20.
35. 401 U.S. 987 (1971), vacating and remanding to 313 F. Supp. 757 (D. Mass.
1970).
36. The federal three-judge district court enjoined the defendant and his agents
from prosecuting Hair, but the injunction was not to issue for a week. The federal
Supreme Court first extended the stay through May 22, 1970. Byrne v. P.B.I.C., Inc.,
397 U.S. 1082 (1970). But on that date, an equally divided Court denied a further stay.
Byrne v. P.B.I.C., Inc., 398 U.S. 916 (1970). Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Black, Harlan and Stewart would have granted the stay.
37. 400 U.S. 929 (1970), denying cert. to 428 F.2d 606 (1st Cir. 1970).
38. This case and other rulings at recent terms which are comparable to Redrup
in that they give the green light to the individual are listed in Appendix III infra.
39. For example, the eight young women who were convicted in Nelson v. Iowa,
178 N.W.2d 434 (Iowa 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971), for disrobing in one
of the student resident halls of Grinnell College failed to persuade the Court to review
their case. This and other rulings at recent terms which have resulted in final judgments of obscenity are listed in Appendix IV infra.
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book on Selective Promiscuity. Ginzburg got five years, and he and
his three corporate co-defendants drew fines aggregating $28,000.00.4o
On his first petition, the Court granted review, but affirmed. 4 '
In that opinion, delivered in March 1966, the Court through Justice
Brennan added to its prurient interest test and requirement of patent
offensiveness the ingredient of pandering. The Court denied Ginzburg's petition for rehearing.4 2 He then asked District Judge Body, the
trial judge, for a reduction or suspension of his five-year prison sen4
tence. Judge Body refused and ordered him to begin his prison term. 1
Ginzburg also contended before Judge Body that he had no knowledge
that the mailing company he had hired had tried to send his publications from such places as Intercourse and Blue Ball, Pennsylvania,
and Middlesex, New Jersey. Still Judge Body granted him no relief.44
However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
by a two-to-one decision, granted a stay pending the outcome of his
new appeal.45 Subsequently, that court heard the new appeal en banc 40
and, by a four-to-three vote, vacated the order of the district court
and sent the case back for an evidentiary hearing. 47 Thereafter, Ginzburg managed to get his sentence reduced from five to three years,
which the Third Circuit affirmed."' This time the Court denied his
petition for a writ of certiorari.4
In two cases, on the request of the federal government, the Court
granted review ;5o but subsequently the Government made dismissal
motions under Rule 60, which the Court also granted. 5 ' One of these
cases involved the film Language of Love. 52 After granting the Government's petition for a writ of certiorari, the Court also granted an
40. United States v. Ginzburg, 224 F. Supp. 129 (E.D. Pa. 1963), aff'd, 338 F.2d
12 (3d Cir. 1964), aff'd, 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
41. 383 U.S. 463 (1966), aff'g 338 F.2d 12 (3d Cir. 1964), aff'g 224 F. Supp. 129
(E.D. Pa. 1963).
42. Ginzburg V'.United States, 384 U.S. 934 (1966).
43. Ginzburg v. United States, 398 F.2d 52 (3d Cir. 1968).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Ginzburg v. United States, 398 F.2d 52 (3d Cir. 1968).
47. Id.
48. Ginzburg v. United States, 436 F.2d 1386 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S.

931 (1971).
49. Ginzburg v. United States, 403 U.S. 931, denying cert. to 436 F.2d 1386 (3d
Cir. 1971). Ginzburg was finally scheduled to begin serving his sentence on February
17, 1972. N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1972, at 14, col. 3.
50. United States v. Unicorn Enterprises, Inc., 401 U.S. 907 (1971), granting
cert. 432 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1970) ; United States v. Various Articles of "Obscene"
Merchandise, 402 U.S. 971 (1971), noting prob. juris. to review 315 F. Supp. 191
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
51. United States v. Unicorn Enterprises, Inc., 403 U.S. 925 (1971); United
States v. Various Articles of "Obscene" Merchandise, 403 U.S. 942 (1971).
52. United States v. Unicorn Enterprises, Inc., 403 U.S. 925 (1971).
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application for a suspension of the Second Circuit's stay of mandate,
thus permitting the film to be shown.5 3
The other case, United States v. Various Articles of "Obscene"
Merchandise,54 involved the question whether the Government may
constitutionally prohibit the importation of obscene material that is
intended for private use only. The Court on the Government's appeal
noted probable jurisdiction; but then on the Government's motion,
dismissed the appeal.5" That case and four others, United States v.
0 United States v. 119 Cartons
Thirty-Seven Photographs,"
Containing 30,000 Obscene Magazines,5 7 United States v. Reidel"8 and United
States v. B & H Distributing Corp.,59 presented questions of the extension of Stanley v. Georgia.6" In the first three of these five cases,
counsel argued that if an adult had the right to possess pornography,
he had the right to bring it into this country from abroad. In Various
Articles of Obscene Merchandise, the items sought to be imported were
for private use; in Thirty-Seven Photographs, the items consisted of
37 photographs for use in a book describing sexual positions that was
for commercial distribution. In Reidel, counsel argued that if an adult
had the right to possess pornography, he had the right to use the mails
to send it to other adults who wanted it; and in the final case, counsel
argued similarly for the transportation of obscene materials in interstate commerce by means of a common carrier.
The Court ruled against these contentions in Thirty-Seven Photographs 1 and Reidel; in the remaining two cases it vacated the judgments and remanded for reconsideration in the light of one or both of
the foregoing two cases.8 2
The Court's rulings in Thirty-Seven Photographs and Reidel
caused Justice Black to complain in a dissent in which Justice Douglas
joined:
Since the plurality opinion offers no plausible reason to distinguish private possession of "obscenity" from importation for pri53. United States v. Unicorn Enterprises, Inc., 402 U.S. 970 (1971).
54. 403 U.S. 942 (1971).
55. Id.

56. 402 U.S. 363 (1971), rev'g 309 F. Supp. 36 (C.D. Cal. 1970).

57. 402 U.S. 969 (1971), vacating and remanding to 324 F. Supp. 1112 (C.D.
Cal. 1970).
58. 402 U.S. 351 (1970), rev'g C.D. Cal. (unreported).
59. 403 U.S. 927 (1971), vacating and remanding to 319 F. Supp. 1231 (W.D.
Wis. 1970).
60. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
61. The federal three-judge district court had held 19 U.S.C. § 1305 (1970) to be
unconstitutional. United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 309 F. Supp. 36 (C.D.
Cal. 1970).
62. United States v. 119 Cartons, 402 U.S. 969 (1971), vacating and remanding to
324 F. Supp. 112 (C.D. Cal. 1970) ; United States v. B & H Distrib. Corp., 403 U.S.
926 (1971), vacating and remanding to 319 F. Supp. 1231 (W.D. Wis. 1970). In the

latter case the district court held 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (1970)
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vate use, I can only conclude that at least four members of the
Court would overrule Stanley. Or perhaps in the future that case
will be recognized as good law only when a man writes salacious
books in his attic, prints them in his basement, and reads them in
his living room.6
The Second Circuit in United States v. Dellapia6" took the same
approach as Justices Black and Douglas. Circuit Judge Irving R.
Kaufman wrote ably for the Court:
The most fundamental premise of our constitutional scheme
may be that every adult bears the freedom to nurture or neglect his
own moral and intellectual growth. In a democracy one is free to
work out one's own salvation in one's own way. If there is a justification for this premise, it is the faith -

or the calculation -

that

to relinquish freedom of self-development would be to abandon
most that is valuable about living. Government censorship of an
adult's private thoughts would, as Stanley recognized, raise havoc
with the individual's personality. The danger to freedom would
hardly be less if private correspondents should need to fear that
the government will monitor their private mail and mark the
emotions and ideas privately revealed therein with a criminal
stigma. If the only reason for a prosecution is to protect an adult
against his own moral standards which do harm to no one else, it
cannot be tolerated. Private communication seems no less part of
freedom than privacy to read one's own books. If not, thenw.the
privacy that Stanley held inviolable is less robust than we would
have thought.65
II.

THE

1971-1972

DOCKET: PERPETUATING THE CONFUSION?

Despite all of the Court's activity in the obscenity area last term,
it still had 22 obscenity cases on its docket when the term ended on
June 30, 1971. More obscenity cases were docketed after that time
and still more were on the way. When the Court convened for its
1971-1972 term, it had 42 obscenity cases on its docket - more than
two-thirds the number of cases docketed during the entire 1970-1971
term - and new cases were being docketed at the rate of about one a
week. If this rate continues, the Court will have one-third again as
many cases on its 1971-1972 docket as it had on its burdened 19701971 docket. 6
Four of the cases on this term's docket involve the film, I Am
Curious (Yellow). Hair, the rock musical, is back. Other cases in63. United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 382 (1971) (Black
& Douglas, JJ., dissenting).
64. 433 F.2d 1252 (2d Cir. 1970).
65. Id. at 1258-59 (footnotes omitted).
66. The cases docketed to date this term are listed in Appendix V infra.
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volve: The Libertine, Man and Wife, and Carmen Baby, films; 69
Potion, a book; "girlie" magazines; peep shows; and stag movies.
The Court at its 1970-1971 term granted review in four of these
cases, 67 more than it used to hear in any average term.
Counsel will argue at the 1971-1972 term, as they did at the
8 The Court will
preceding one, for extensions of Stanley v. Georgia."

also consider the question whether the contemporary community standards to be applied in judging obscenity are national or local ones. At
0 and
least three cases, Miller v. United States,6 Miller v. California"
71
Wall v. California, present this issue, among others, despite the fact
that the question had been considered by many to be settled.
After Roth v. United States,72 there was ample reason to believe
that the contemporary community standards which the Court had in
mind were national ones. Justice Harlan, who announced the judgment of the Court in Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day,7' a case involving publications beamed at homosexuals, said so in his opinion in
that case ;74 and Justice Brennan voiced the same opinion when he announced the judgment of the Court in Jacobellis v. Ohio,75 where the
Court lifted an Ohio ban on the French film The Lovers (Les Amants).76
The New Jersey supreme court so held in State v. Hudson County
News Co. 77 However, further investigation shows that the question
67. United States v. Twelve Reels, 403 U.S. 930 (1971), noting prob. juris. to
review C.D. Cal. (Apr. 27, 1970) (unreported) ; Mitchum v. Foster, 402 U.S. 941
(1971), noting prob. juris, to review 315 F. Supp. 1387 (N.D. Fla. 1970); Miller v.
alifornia, 401 U.S. 992 (1971), noting prob. jurs, to review Cal. Super. Ct. App.
(1970) (unreported); Col-An Entertainment Corp. v. Harper, 402 U.S. 941, noting
prob. juris. to review 325 F. Supp. 447 (N.D. Fla. 1971).
68. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
69. 431 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1970), petition for cert. filed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3247 (U.S.
Nov. 27, 1970) (No. 1014, 1970 Term; renumbered No. 70-43, 1971 Term).
70. Cal. Super. Ct. App. (1970) (unreported), prob. juris, noted, 401 U.S. 992
(1971).
71. Cal. Super. Ct. App. (unreported), appeal docketed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3446
(U.S. Apr. 5, 1971) (No. 1541, 1970 Term; renumbered No. 70-111, 1971 Term).
72. 354 U.S. 476 (1957), aff'g Roth v. United States, 237 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1956),
and People v. Alberts, 138 Cal. App. 2d 909, 292 P.2d 90 (Super. Ct. App. 1955).
73. 370 U.S. 478 (1962), rev'g 289 F.2d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
74. Id. at 488. Justice Harlan stated:
There must first be decided the relevant "community" in terms of whose standards
of decency the issue must be judged. We think that the proper test under this
federal statute, reaching as it does to all parts of the United States whose population reflects many different ethnic and cultural backgrounds, is a national standard
of decency.
Id.
75. 378 U.S. 184 (1964), rev'g 173 Ohio St. 22, 179 N.E.2d 777 (1962), aff'g
115 Ohio App. 226, 175 N.E.2d 123 (1961).
76. Justice Brennan stated:
We thus reaffirm the position taken in Roth to the effect that the constitutional
status of an allegedly obscene work must be determined on the basis of a national
standard. It is, after all, a national constitution we are expounding.
Id. at 195 (footnote omitted).
77. 41 N.J. 247, 196 A.2d 225 (1963). The court in that case stated:
Accordingly, we hold that the contemporary community standard to be applied
under our statute is not the standard of a particular individual, group of in-
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of national versus local standards does not appear to be resolved in
the opinion of all members of the Court. Chief Justice Warren, in
his dissenting opinion in Jacobellis, expressed the view that community standards meant exactly that, and not a single national standard:
But communities throughout the Nation are in fact diverse, and
it must be remembered that, in cases such as this one, the Court
is confronted with the task of reconciling conflicting rights of the
diverse communities within our society and of individuals.78
The October 1971 term of the Court promises to be another of its
obscenity terms.
The Supreme Court has indeed become, in the prophetically apprehensive phrase of Justice Robert H. Jackson in 1948 during the
course of the argument on Edmund Wilson's Memoirs of Hecate
County, the "High Court of Obscenity. ' 79 There the Court, evenly
divided, Justice Frankfurter not sitting, affirmed an obscenity holding.
Justice Jackson in colloquy said:
Does your argument mean that we would have to take every obscenity case and decide the constitutional issues on the merits of
the literary work? It seems to me that would mean that we would
become the High Court of Obscenity."
The Court has more than borne out the fears which Justice Hugo
Black expressed in December 1965, during the course of the argument
on Fanny Hill and other items. Justice Black observed: "The problem still arises whether this Court can do all this censorship and do
anything else and whether it is the one who should do the censoring if anyone should."'"
It has also more than earned the reproach of Justice John M.
Harlan in his dissenting opinion in 1968, in Interstate Circuit, Inc.
v. Dallas,12 where the Court invalidated a Dallas censorship ordinance
for motion pictures:
From the standpoint of the Court itself the current approach has
required us to spend an inordinate amount of time in the absurd
dividuals, or locality, but it is the standard of the contemporary society of this
country at large.
Id. at 266, 196 A.2d at 235; accord, Excellent Publications, Inc. v. United States,

309 F.2d 362, 365 (1st Cir. 1962). Contra, Gent v. State, 239 Ark. 474, 393 S.W.2d
219 (1965), rev'd, 386 U.S. 767 (1967). See also United States v. Klaw, 350 F.2d
155, 168 n.14 (2d Cir. 1965).
78. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 200-01 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
79. The case was Doubleday & Co. v. New York, 335 U.S. 848 (1948), aff'g by

an evenly divided Court 297 N.Y. 687, 77 N.E.2d 6 (1947).
80. Oral Argument, 17 U.S.L.W. 3119 (U.S. Oct. 21, 1948), Doubleday & Co. v.
New York, 335 U.S. 848 (1948).
81. N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1965, at 28, cols. 1-3.

82. 390 U.S. 676 (1968).
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business of perusing and viewing the miserable stuff that pours
into the Court, mostly in state cases, all to no better end than
second-guessing state judges."5
Not only has the Court become the High Court of Obscenity,
but also the last and the current terms of the Court, and the coming
term -

with the same load of obscenity cases as the other two -

may

appropriately be called, without too much exaggeration, the obscenity
terms.
Three years ago the writer, usually of an optimistic frame of mind,
saw a ray of hope in Redrup84 and the Court's repeated use of it as a
basis for per curiam reversals of obscenity judgments. From this development he inferred that a majority of the Court had gathered behind Justice Stewart's concept equating obscenity with hard-core
pornography."5 It then appeared that the Court, to paraphrase Justice
Stewart, thought it knew obscenity when it saw it, even though it
could not intelligibly describe it in the abstract. Perhaps the Court
had not quite "turned the law of obscenity into a constitutional disaster
area,"8 6 as many of us once feared it had. Perhaps after all the law
of obscenity would settle down to something bearable. In this respect
it was encouraging that, on the Court's docket for its 1968-1969 term,
the number of applications for review in obscenity contests was far
fewer than at any preceding term. A comparable occurrence took
place in the commerce clause litigation over a century ago. As in the
obscenity cases, the Passenger Cases"7 in 1849 had resulted in eight
separate opinions and "a seemingly hopeless inability to agree on a
general interpretation of the commerce power."88 But two years later
9 the Taney Court handed down a
in Cooley v. Board of Wardens,"
decision defining the respective roles of federal and state governments
under the commerce clause which has remained viable ever since.
From this historical perspective, it appeared possible that if we continued our course as "a maturing society"9 and the rest of the world
83. Id. at 707.
84. Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967) ; see Rogge, "[T]he High Court
of Obscenity" (pts. 1 & 2), 41 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 201 (1969).
85. Circuit Judge Bailey Aldrich was equally optimistic in Karalexis v. Byrne,
306 F. Supp. 1363 (D. Mass. 1969), vacated, 401 U.S. 216 (1971). He wrote for the
federal three-judge district court:
[I]f only four, or even three, justices agree on one method by which immunity
is reached, this agreement is as significant as if five joined, so long as there are
enough other justices who can be counted on to concur in the result. If we may be
pardoned the analogy, if deuces are wild, an inside straight flush and a deuce takes
the pot.
Id. at 1365 n.4.
86. Magrath, The Obscenity Cases: Grapes of Roth, 1966 Sup. CT. REV. 7, 59.
87. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 282 (1849).
88. C. SWISHER, ROGER B. TANEY 404 (1935).
89. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 298 (1851).
90. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
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with us, it might be that we could live with Redrup until such time as
obscenity contests, along with wars, prisons and capital punishment,
became obsolete.
The writer's optimism turned out to be short-lived. There were
more obscenity cases on the Court's 1969-1970 docket, the first year
of the Burger Court, than there were on the 1968-1969 docket, the
last year of the Warren Court. With the 1970-1971 docket came the
flood that continues to date.
Of course, there was also an increase of obscenity prosecutions
across the country. This may be due in part to a reaction to what some
regard as undue permissiveness in the obscenity area under recent
Supreme Court decisions. It may also be due in part to the fact that
the result of these decisions has led to a vast increase in the number
of incidences of what traditionally may have been termed obscenity.
Three years ago, the writer pointed out that nudity had been entering
on the center stage in the movies, in the theater and elsewhere. 9 ' It
has now arrived. One of his then illustrations was Tom O'Horgan's
production of the rock musical Hair, which in one scene showed mass
fullfront nudity of four or five young men and several girls. Nudity
spread to the news when a photograph of that scene appeared as part
of an article in The New York Times Magazine. 2
To nudity has been added the depiction of sexual acts. Two films
involved in the cases on the Court's 1970-1971 docket are illustrative:
I Am Curious (Yellow) and Language of Love. Two circuit court
judges in pending cases described I Aim Curious (Yellow). Circuit
Judge Hays, in the opinion for the Second Circuit, which held the film
to be not obscene by a vote of two to one, wrote:
There are a number of scenes which show the young girl and her
lover nude. Several scenes depict sexual intercourse under varying circumstances, some of them quite unusual. There are scenes
of oral genital activity.
It seems to be conceded that the sexual content of the film is
presented with greater explicitness than has been seen in any
other film produced for general viewing. 3
Circuit Judge Celebrezze, who wrote the opinion for a three-judge
court in Grove Press, Inc. v. Flask,94 which is on the Court's 19711972 docket, was even more graphic:
91. Rogge, supra note 84.
92. Kerr, The Theater of Say It! Show It! What Is Itf, N.Y. Times, Sept. 1,
1968, § 6 (Magazine), at 10, 11.
93. United States v. "I Am Curious (Yellow)," 404 F.2d 196, 198 (2d Cir. 1968).
94. Grove Press, Inc. v. Flask, 326 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Ohio 1970), petition for
cert. filed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3005 (U.S. July 6, 1970) (No. 70-1).
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The film tract, "I Am Curious (Yellow)" depicts the curious
searchings of a young woman attempting to personally relate her
existence to the political, social and sexual currents of Swedish
democracy. In relating to the complex of real and imagined forces
which composed her life in a democracy, the heroine of the film
engaged in numerous normal and abnormal sexual episodes, each
of which was graphically portrayed to the viewer.
Our heroine's search for equality of women's rights in a democracy was ironically portrayed by her helpless submission to the
advances of a young man who had "loaned" her father $90 to gain
entrance to her home. Thereafter, the director chose to express
his contempt for established institutions by having his lead actors
engage in coitus on the balastrade of the National Palace in front
of a guard as the Swedish national anthem played, and then to
acrobatically engage in coitus in the oldest tree in Europe while
a religious ceremony was portrayed in the background. Subsequent acts of coitus, fellatio, cunnilingus and suggested acts of
sodomy were depicted between the couple, including some rather
violent moments at a "religious" retreat, and an array of explicit
sexual acts in a variety of settings after our heroine realized how
tragically self-defeating her relationship was with her lover, as
well as how incongruous were her political and sexual philosophies.95
As for Language of Love, Circuit Judge Moore for the Second
Circuit, which held the film to be not obscene, wrote:
"Language of Love," a Swedish-made film, is a movie version of
the "marriage manual" - that ubiquitous panacea (in the view
of some) for all that ails modern man-woman relations. Assuming the Masters and Johnson premise that the path to marital
euphoria and social utopia lies in the perfection and practice of
clinically correct and complete sexual technology, this film offers
to light that path in a way the masses can understand. It purports
to be a veritable primer of marital relations, or perhaps the Kama
Sutra of electronic media, although the film is nowhere nearly as
rich in the variety of its smorgasbord of delights as comparison
with that ancient Hindu classic might suggest. . . . Towards the
end of the film, a gynecological examination and the emplacement
by a doctor of contraceptive devices in two young women are
portrayed. 6
The increase in obscenity cases may also be due, in part, to the
fact that prosecutors may anticipate a more conservative approach to
be forthcoming from the four new members of the Court, Chief Justice
95. Id. at 585.
96. United States v. "Language of Love," 432 F.2d 705-07 (2d Cir. 1970) (footnote omitted).
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Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell and Rhenquist. Whatever the
reasons, there are clearly more obscenity prosecutions than in the
recent past.
III.

AVAILABLE ALTERNATIVES: TAKING OBSCENITY OUT OF

THE HIGH COURT

A.

Alternative 1

-

Abandoning Legislation and Regulation
of Morals

Now it may be that the members of the Court find the study of
obscenity cases a way of relaxing their minds. The Justices probably
engage in more hard thinking than any other body in the world. Just
as others find relaxation from their business duties in bridge, or golf,
or chess, or music, or the theatre, so it may be that the members of
the Court find relaxation from the hard thinking which many of the
issues before them require by turning to the records in some of the
obscenity contests.
However, if we wish to get the Supreme Court, and other courts
as well, out of the obscenity muddle in which they have mired themselves and to let the judges apply their minds to more urgent, as well
as more challenging problems, there are four possible ways of doing
so. One way is to accept the recommendations of the 18-member
federal Commission on Obscenity and Pornography, headed by Dean
William B. Lockhart of the University of Minnesota Law School, and
repeal all federal, state and local legislation prohibiting the sale, exhibition or distribution of sexual material to consenting adults.
After Redrup, Congress established the Commission on Obscenity
and Pornography." The two chief sponsors of the legislation, Senator
Karl E. Mundt, Republican from South Dakota, and Representative
Dominick V. Daniels, Democrat from New Jersey, said the Commission's emphasis would probably be on hard-core pornography.9" The
Commission was:
(1)

.

..

to evaluate and recommend definitions of obscenity and

pornography;
(3) to study the effect of obscenity and pornography upon the
public, and particularly minors, and its relationship to crime and
other antisocial behavior; and
(4) to recommend such legislative, administrative or other advisable and appropriate action as the Commission deems neces97. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1970).
98. N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1967, at 25, col. 1.
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sary to regulate effectively the flow of such traffic, without in any
way interfering with constitutional rightsf 9
The Commission was to report its findings and recommendations to
the President and Congress as soon as practicable and in any event
not later than January 31, 1970.10 The Commission transmitted its
final report on September 30, 1970. Its legislative recommendations,
with reference to statutes relating to adults, begins with this paragraph:
The Commission recommends that federal, state and local legislation prohibiting the sale, exhibition, or distribution of sexual materials to consenting adults should be repealed. Twelve of the 17
participating members of the Commission join in this recommendation. Two additional Commissioners subscribe to the bulk
of the Commission's Report, but do not believe that the evidence
presented at this time is sufficient to warrant the repeal of all prohibitions upon what adults may obtain. Three Commissioners dissent from the recommendation to repeal adult legislation and would
retain existing laws prohibiting the dissemination of obscene materials to adults. 1 '
This recommendation is not only constitutionally sound, but also
legislatively wise. As to consenting adults, there should be no obscenity
legislation or litigation as such. If there is conduct which amounts to
a breach of the peace, or disorderly conduct, or trespass, or indecent
exposure, or contributing to the delinquency of a minor, or the like,
prosecute such conduct. But let individuals read, see or hear whatever
they like; in the long run we shall be better off; the pornographers
will have their day and that will be that. A not atypical illustration
of this point is this writer's experience with two nudist periodicals.
Within three years after he obtained second-class mail rates for Sunshine & Health and Sun Magazine, his nudist clients went into bankruptcy, corporately and individually. Their explanation to him was
that they now had so much competition that they could not make a
living.
The writer takes the position that constitutionally, obscenity laws
are beyond the power of Congress under the absolute prohibition of
the first amendment; and that, in any event, legislatively they are un99. 18 U.S.C. § 1461(5) (a) (1970).
100. Id. § 1461(5)(b).
101.

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY

51-52 (1970)

(footnotes omitted and emphasis supplied by the Commission). An edition of the
Report with illustrative pictures was held obscene by the Criminal Court of the City

of New York. See Schumach, Obscene Photos PornographicRegardless of Text,
Court Says, N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1971, at 30, cols. 7-8. However, a jury later acquitted

the defendant. See McFadden, Obscenity-Report Seller Acquitted Here, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 30, 1971, at 152, cols. 3-5.
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wise. Although he concedes that under the tenth amendment the states
have some power over obscenity, whereas under the first amendment
the federal government has none, he is of the further view that the
states are unwise to use their power. Suppression is not the solution
for the obscenity problem. This does not mean that nudists, for instance, may stage a parade unclad on Fifth Avenue in New York City,
or on any street of that or any other city. They may not. Or as
Justice John D. Voelker (author, under the pen name of Robert
Traver, of Anatomy of a Murder), put it in People v. Hildabridle,°2
where the Michigan supreme court reversed the convictions of some
nudists on the ground that there had been an illegal search and
seizure, nudists may not "boldly" stage a "nude missionary expeditiQn
on the main street of Battle Creek."' 2 If individuals engage in conduct, other than speech, which violates applicable provisions of statute
or common law, prosecute them for such conduct. But do not prosecute them under obscenity laws. This was the approach of Justice
Fortescue in Rex v. Curl'1 4 more than two centuries ago in what was
really the first reported decision in England sustaining a conviction
for obscenity. There the defendant, Edmund Curl, bookseller, printer
and pirate of literature, was convicted at the king's bench for publishing an "obscene libel." However, Justice Fortescue expressed a doubt
about proscribing obscenity as such which represents the writer's view:
"To make it indictable there should be a breach of the peace, or something tending to it, of which there is nothing in this case. ' 5
Moreover, the causes of deviant behavior are too many, too subtle,
too intangible and too deeply rooted in an individual's past for the
material he reads or the pictures he sees to be among them. There is
simply no evidence which directly connects the material which individuals read or the pictures they see with subsequent deviant behavior.
The Commission on Obscenity and Pornography wrote:
Extensive empirical investigation, both by the Commission and
by others, provides no evidence that exposure to or use of explicit sexual materials play a significant role in the causation of
social or individual harms such as crime, delinquency, sexual or
nonsexual deviancy or severe emotional disturbances.
In sum empirical research designed to clarify the question has
found no evidence to date that exposure to explicit sexual ma102.
103.
104.
105.

353 Mich. 562, 92 N.W.2d 6 (1958).
Id. at 584, 590, 92 N.W.2d at 15, 18.
93 Eng. Rep. 849 (K.B. 1727).
Id. at 851.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1972

15

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 3 [1972], Art. 1

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 17 : p. 393

terials plays a significant role in the causation of delinquent or
criminal behavior among youth or adults.' 0 6
Additional support for this contention may be found in Sex Offenders,
a 923-page report published in 1965 by four of the late Dr. Alfred C.
Kinsey's associates at the Institute for Sex Research.'0 7 That report
shows that although many sexual offenders committed their offenses
while drunk, few were influenced by seeing or reading objectionable
material. The report contains a statistical analysis of interviews with
1,356 white men in the United States who were convicted of rape,
homosexuality, offenses against children and a variety of other sexual
crimes. Comparing their records with those of 888 white men jailed
for nonsexual crimes and 477 non-criminals, the authors found "that
rather large proportions of the men reported little or no sexual arousal

from pornography."' 0 s Deviants responded more to the sight of a
woman than to a picture of one. Furthermore, a survey by the Bureau of Social Hygiene of New York City indicates that neither publications nor pictures have any appreciable relationship to sexual deviation or juvenile delinquency. The Bureau sent questionnaires to
10,000 female graduates of colleges and normal schools. In the 1,200
answers received, not one of the women specified a "dirty" book as
the source of sex information. Of the 409 replies in answer to the
question concerning what things were most stimulating sexually, the
majority noted very simply, "Man."' 0 9
Indeed, there are experts who not only disagree with those who
assert a causal connection between obscenity and delinquency, but take
exactly the opposite position: they suggest that publications, rather
than causing delinquency, may act as an emotional catharsis. These
experts contend, in the words of the commentary of Tentative Draft
No. 6 of the Model Penal Code, that "for an undetermined number
of individuals the writing or reading of obscenity may be a substitute
for rather than a stimulus to physical sexuality."" 0 In his book The
Sexual Offender and His Offenses, Dr. Benjamin Karpman, chief
psychologist of Saint Elizabeth's Hospital in Washington, D.C., discussed the relation between reading and sexual activity in the following terms:
Contrary to popular misconception, people who read salacious
literature are less likely to become sexual offenders than those
106.

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY 52-53 (1970).
CHRISTENSON, J. GAGNON, P. GEBHARD & W. POMEROY, SEX OFFENDERS

107. C.

(1965).
108. Id. at 670.

109. Alpert, Judicial Censorship of Obscene Literature, 52 HARV. L. REv. 40, 73
(1938).
110. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10, at 24 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957).
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who do not, for the reason that such reading often neutralizes
what aberrant sexual interests they may have. 1 '
Professor Walter Gelhorn also shares this view. After describing censorship as a nostrum rather than a remedy and observing that
reliance on it would simply delay the therapeutic and preventive steps
that must be taken if youthful anti-social conduct is to be lessened,
he continued:
The offsetting possibility derives from the Aristotelian concept of emotional catharsis, shared now by many psychiatrists
who believe that aggressions and frustrations that might otherwise flare into overt conduct are not fanned to flame but, instead,
are more often dissipated, or at least made temporarily quiescent,
by reading." 2
In his concurring opinion in Memoirs v. Massachusetts,"3 Justice
Douglas pointed out that a connection between erotica and deviant
conduct had not been established; contrariwise, he indicated that
pornographic literature might act as a substitute rather than a stimulant for such conduct." 4 In his dissent in Ginzburg v. United States,"'
he made this observation even more pointedly:
Man was not made in a fixed mould. If a publication caters to
the idiosyncrasies of a minority, why does it not have some
"social importance"? Each of us is a very temporary transient
with likes and dislikes that cover the spectrum. However plebian
my tastes may be, who am I to say that others' tastes must be so
limited and that other tastes have no "social importance"? How can
we know enough to probe the mysteries of the subconscious of our
people and say that this is good for them and that is not? Catering to
the most eccentric taste may have "social importance" in giving
that minority an opportunity to express itself rather than to
repress its inner desires, as I suggest in my separate opinion in
Memoirs v. Massachusetts .

.

.

. How can we know that this

expression may not prevent anti-social conduct?...
Moreover, the studies by Dr. Kinsey and his associates demonstrated that erotic responses, whether normal or abnormal, were as
frequently evoked by objects and literature which were not sexual
in the conventional sense as they were by the more usual sexual
111. B.

112. W.

His OFFENSES 485 (1954).
GELLHORN, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT RESTRAINT 64 (1956).

KARPMAN, THE SEXUAL OFFENDER AND

113. 383 U.S. 413 (1966), rev'g 349 Mass. 69, 206 N.E.2d 403 (1965)

[hereinafter

referred to as Fanny Hill].
114. 383 U.S. at 431-32.
115. 383 U.S. 463 (1966), af'g 338 F.2d 12 (3d Cir. 1964), aff'g 224 F. Supp. 129
(E.D. Pa. 1963).
116. 383 U.S. at 491 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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stimuli." 7' Justice Douglas expressed the same thought in his opinion
in Fanny Hill: "It would be a futile effort even for a censor to attempt to remove all that might possibly stimulate antisocial sexual
conduct." ' " 8 An old faded bridal crown hanging framed on a wall
might prove sexually stimulating to a modern Oedipus. Judge Bok
wrote comparably nearly two decades ago in Commonwealth v.
Gordon :"9

I can find no universally valid restriction on free expression to
be drawn from the behavior of 'Thomme moyen sensuel," who
is the average modern reader. It is impossible to say just what
his reactions to a book actually are. Moyen means, generally,
average, and average means a median between extremes. If he
reads an obscene book when his sensuality is low, he will yawn
over it or find that its suggestibility leads him off on quite different paths. If he reads the Mechanics' Lien Act while his
sensuality is high, things will stand between him and the page
that have no business there. How can anyone say that he will
infallibly be affected one way or another by one book or another ?120
In Ginsberg v. New York, 121 Justices Brennan and Douglas (the
former writing for the majority, the latter in dissent) returned again
to the controversy regarding the effect of allegedly obscene material
on deviant conduct. Justice Brennan quoted the legislative finding of
section 484(e) 12 2 of the New York Penal Code to the effect that
the material condemned by section 484 (h) 12 was "a basic factor in
impairing the ethical and moral development of our youth and a clear
and present danger to the people of the state." He then commented:
"It is very doubtful that this finding expresses an accepted scientific
fact.' 1

24

At the end of the paragraph, however, he quoted Magrath's

summary and agreed that, while studies on the relationship between
what one reads and what one does not "all agree that a causal link
has not been demonstrated, they are all equally agreed that a causal
link has not been disproved either."' 125 The Court concluded that
since we do not know what impact this type of material has on con117. A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY, & C. MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN
MALE 510 (1948); A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY, & C. MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN
THE HUMAN FEMALE 669-70 (1953).
118. 383 U.S. at 432 n..
119. 66 Pa. D. & C. 101 (Ct. Quarter Sess. 1949), aff'd sub nom. Commonwealth
v. Feigenbaum, 166 Pa. Super. 120, 70 A.2d 389 (1950).
120. Id. at 137-38.
121. 390 U.S. 692 (1968).
122. N.Y. PENAL CODE § 484(e) (McKinney 1967).
123. Id. § 484(h).
124. 390 U.S. at 641.
125. Id. at 642, quoting Magrath, supra note 86, at 52.
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duct, New York's obscenity legislation for the protection of youth

/

was constitutional.
The writer would argue that the lack of understanding of the
effect of literature on conduct is as good a reason for overturning as for
upholding obscenity legislation. Justice Douglas' dissent in Ginsberg
supports this contention:
Today this Court sits as the Nation's board of censors. With
all respect, I do not know of any group in the country less
qualified first, to know what obscenity is when they see it,
and second, to have any considered judgment as to what the
deleterious or beneficial impact of a particular publication may
have on minds either young or old. 2 "
The nonsense in the obscenify area exists on both sides, on the
side of those who defy the censors as well as on the side of
the censors themselves. Those who fill their writings with fourletter words and those who disseminate nude pictures are neurotically motivated, but so are the censors. The Henry Millers,
the D. H. Lawrences, the James Joyces, and the nudists are psychologically sick; but so are the Comstocks and the Bowdlers, the
leaders of the National Office for Decent Literature and the Citizens for Decent Literature, and the heads of the societies for the suppression of vice. In this category, the writer includes his nudist
clients, the oldest among whom was an octogenarian Baptist minister - a Master of Sacred Theology who looked the part, for he had
a rather heavy fringe of white hair which framed a cherubic face.
He was a great grandfather, whose children, grandchildren and great
grandchildren, so the old nudist said, were all nudists. The writer
as counsel helped the old man state his thesis: that the practice of
nudism would satisfy the healthy curiosity of children and eliminate
the unhealthy curiosity of adults about the human body. This was
better phrased than the old nudist's formulation, but it was what he
wanted to say. With this thesis, we went through several major
proceedings with the Post Office Department, as well as various
proceedings with state officials. The old man vigorously adhered to
the principle that the human body should be shown as it actually
was. The opposition of the Post Office Department focused on the
showing of pubic hair. After nearly a decade of struggle with the
federal government, the Supreme Court ruled summarily in Sunshine Book Company v. Summerfield,"2 ' that his two nudist publi126. 390 U.S. at 656 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
127. 355 U.S. 372 (1958), rev/g 249 F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir. 1957), aff'g 128 F. Supp.
564 (D.D.C. 1955).
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cations Sunshine & Health and Sun Magazine were not obscene.
After another contest, Judge Luther W. Youngdahl ruled that these
publications were entitled to second-class mail rates, saying:
The precepts of nudism presented by "Sunshine & Health" and
'Sun Magazine' do not have the public acceptance given the
ideas and way of life presented by Ladies' Home Journal and
House and Garden, but they are not, for that reason, undeserving of equal treatment by the Postal Service.' 2 8
Yet, in the view of counsel, the thesis of his nudist clients was
nonsense, all nonsense. Nevertheless, the writer's nudist clients told
him that one day, and before too long, there would be nude bathing
at our public beaches. Inwardly, the writer scoffed at the idea. But
with the topless era knocking at the door, who knows but that the
nudists, at least on this point, may turn out to be right.
As for the critics of the old nudist, those who would censor his
publications were even more full of nonsense than he was. The Supreme Court was right in summarily holding his publications to be
not obscene, and Judge Youngdahl was right in ruling that they were
entitled to second-class mail rates.
The censors would be well advised to take a respite from their
lugubriations to examine their own minds. They are full of sound
and fury, but their words do not signify what the censors think they
do. When they voice fears for the rest of us and for the young,
perhaps what they are really doing is revealing their own fear about
themselves. Henry Miller, the author of Tropic of Cancer, quotes
Dr. Ernest Jones, the biographer of Sigmund Freud, as saying:
It is the people with secret attractions to various temptations
who busy themselves with removing these temptations from other
people; really they are defending themselves under the pretext
of defending
others, because at heart they fear their own weak1 29
ness.

The author is not interested in what Henry Miller writes, but in
what Dr. Jones says. Or as Justice Douglas put it in his dissenting
opinion in which Justice Black joined, in Ginsberg v. New York,'
where the Court sustained the validity of obscenity legislation for
the protection of youth: "Censors are, of course, propelled by their
13
own neuroses." '
128. Sunshine Publishing Co. v. Summerfield, 184 F. Supp. 767, 772 (D.D.C.
1960) (footnote omitted).
129. Miller, Obscenity and the Law of Reflection, 51 Ky. L.J. 577, 580 (1963).

130. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
131. Id. at 655.
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Let each one take care of his own neurosis, and not try to give
unsolicited directions, legislative, judicial or otherwise, to the rest
of us on how to handle ours.
However, with President Richard M. Nixon and Vice President
Spiro T. Agnew condemning the Report of the Commission of Obscenity and Pornography, with the United States Senate, by a 60 to
5 roll call vote overwhelmingly passing a resolution denouncing the
Report,1 2 and with the current climate of public opinion, there is no
possibility of achieving the legislative recommendations of the Commission as to adults. Senator John L. McClellan, Democrat from
Arkansas, who was one of the sponsors of the resolution, asserted
that :
[T]he Congress might just as well have asked the pornographers
to write this report, although I doubt that even they would have
had the temerity and effrontery to make the ludicrous recommendations that were made by the Commission.""
While the writer feels that the censors' time might better be
spent healing themselves instead of infecting others, he also takes a
puritanical approach to those who fill their writings with four-letter
words, as well as those who distribute nude or near-nude pictures.
He sees neither the need nor the use for such activities. Those who
insist on using an abundance of four-letter words should, like the
censors, examine their own minds. Are they going back to the rebellion and defiance of their battles with their parents in their infant
years? Indeed, in one respect, the writer will go the censors one better
and then some; he will adumbrate that if human beings continue
to mature, they will one day give up fiction for fact as more suitable
fare for thinking minds.
As for the nudists and those especially interested in pictures of
nudes or near-nudes, whether of male or female figures, or near-nudes
in chains, or being tormented, or otherwise encumbered, the problem
would appear to be primarily a male one. The record in Manual
Enterprises,Inc. v. Day.. shows that the pictures of the male models
in the three publications there involved, Manual, Trim and Grecian
Guild Pictorial, were for homosexuals. But the ones who are interested in pictures of female nudes are also primarily males; and, among
the nudists, males would appear to 'be somewhat more interested in
nudism than are females.
132. S. REP. No. 477, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).

133. 116 CoNG. REc. S17904 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1970).
134. 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
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If the male is more interested than the female in the nude figure,
whether of male or female, one can ask whether this interest involves,
in part, the same fear. If so, one can speak not unsympathetically of
one approach as the bold one, and the other as the timid one. One
can say that the nudist approach is the bold one, for the nudists compel themselves to look continuously at the nude female. Contrariwise, one can characterize the homosexual approach as the timid one,
for they, like Perseus slaying the Gorgon Medusa, cannot bear to
look upon the female figure at all. Despite such characterizations, or
perhaps because of them, the conclusion must remain the same:
"deviant" or otherwise unusual sexual tastes and proclivities are the
consequences of individual mental processes; for this reason, they
cannot be regulated. Likewise, until such behavior manifests itself
in some clear, concrete deleterious effect on society or other individuals, it should not be regulated.
B.

Alternative 2

-

Approaching the First Amendment
as an Absolute

Another way to get our courts out of the obscenity muddle is to
adopt the view of Justices Black and Douglas that there are no exceptions to the first amendment, for obscenity or anything else. These
two Justices draw the distinction recognized by Jefferson and Madison between words and deeds, between utterances and criminal conduct other than utterances. Jefferson, for instance, in his draft of A
Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, which he introduced into
the Virginia Assembly in 1779 and which passed that body in 1785,
stated:
[T]hat to suffer the civil magistrate to intrude his powers into
the field of opinion, and to restrain the profession or propagation of principles on supposition of their ill tendency is a dangerous fallacy, which at once destroys all religious liberty, because
he being of course judge of that tendency will make his opinions
the rule of judgment, and approve or condemn the sentiments of
others only as they shall square with or differ from his own;
that it is time enough for the rightful purposes of civil government, for its officers to interfere when principles break out into
overt acts against peace and good order." 85
He expressed the same thought more than two decades later in a letter
of July 3, 1801 to Elijah Boardman:
But we have nothing to fear from the demoralizing reasonings
of some, if others are left to demonstrate their errors. And
135. 2

THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol17/iss3/1

546 (Boyd ed. 1950).

22

Rogge: The Obscenity Terms of the Court
FEBRUARY

1972]

OBSCENITY

TERMS

especially when the law stands ready to punish the first criminal
act produced by the false reasoning. These are safer correctives
than the conscience of a judge.3 6
Even before Jefferson presented the draft of his bill to the Virginia Assembly, the Rev. Philip Furneaux, a dissenting divine, in
one of a series of famous letters to Blackstone, eloquently urged the
same approach:
[T]he tendency of principles, though it be unfavourable, is not
prejudicial to society, till it issues in some overt acts against the
public peace and order; and when it does, then the magistrate's
authority to punish commences; that it, he may punish the overt
acts, but not the tendency, which is not actually hurtful; and,
therefore, his penal laws should be directed against overt acts
only. .

.

. [Principles] cannot be restrained by penal laws, ex-

cept with the total destruction of civil liberty."

'

Moreover, Jefferson and Madison carried their distinction between utterance and conduct other than utterance into the first amendment. Thus, Justices Black and Douglas are historically correct in
their insistence that the first amendment has no obscenity exception.
However, the rest of the Court does not agree. Justices Black and
Douglas stand alone, and Justice Black has gone from the Court.
C.
1.

Alternative 3

-

Repudiation of the Incorporation Theory

Foundation of the Theory

A third way for our courts to get out of the obscenity muddle,
at least in large part, is to take the position of Justice Harlan, which
was also that of Justice Frankfurter, that the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment does not incorporate the first eight amendments.
Just as Justices Black and Douglas are historically correct that there
are no exceptions to the first amendment, so Justices Frankfurter and
Harlan are historically correct that the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment as such does not make the federal Bill of
Rights applicable to the states. The result would be that whatever
power there would be over obscenity would rest in the states, as
limited by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, and
not in the federal government because of the sweeping prohibition of
the first amendment. This result will also accord with our federal
governmental structure, for under it the prosecution of offenses, as the
136. Id. at 550.

137.

LETTERS TO THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTIcE BLACKSTONE 53-55 (1770).
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Court has more than once pointed out, is primarily the concern of
the states." 8"
Just as the Court has not followed Justices Black and Douglas
in their historically correct view that there are no exceptions to the
first amendment, so the Court has not followed Justices Frankfurter
and Harlan in their historically correct view that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment does not incorporate the first
eight amendments. Although the Court never fully accepted the incorporation theory, propounded by Justice Black in his dissent in
Adamson v. California,8 ' it nevertheless travelled so far in the direction of the result he sought to obtain in Adamson that it seemed
substantially to have arrived there, with but the single exception of
the fifth amendment provision for indictment by a grand jury. This
was the only exception that it seemed safe to say would not be made
applicable to the states. 40 The Court accomplished this result by the
138. For example, in the Court's opinion in Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371
(1958), Justice Frankfurther wrote:
Except insofar as penal remedies may be provided by Congress under the explicit
authority to "make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution" the other powers granted by Art. I, § 8, the bulk of authority to legislate on what may be compendiously described as criminal justice, which in other
nations belongs to the central government, is under our system the responsibility
of the individual States.
Id. at 375. Or again in the Court's opinion in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165
(1952), this same Justice said:
In our federal system the administration of criminal justice is predominantly
committed to the care of the States. The power to define crimes belongs to Congress only as an appropriate means of carrying into execution its limited grant
of legislative powers.
Id. at 168. Or yet again, in the Court's opinion in Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S.
101 (1943), Justice Douglas stated:
Since there is no common law offense against the United States ... the administration of criminal justice under our federal system has rested with the states,
except as criminal offenses have been explicitly prescribed by Congress.
Id. at 104-05.
Justice Frankfurter, in his concurring opinion in Malinski v. New York, 324
U.S. 401 (1945), commented:
Apart from permitting Congress to use criminal sanctions as means for
carrying into execution powers granted to it, the Constitution left the domain of
criminal justice to the States.
Id. at 412-13. Justice Stanley Reed, in his dissenting opinion in Pennsylvania v.
Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 519 (1956), in which Justices Harold H. Burton and Sherman
Minton joined, relied upon this fact. He quoted a section of the federal criminal code
which provides: "Nothing in this title shall be held to take away or impair the jurisdiction of the courts of the several States under the laws thereof." Then he observed:
"That declaration springs from the federal character of our Nation. It recognizes the
fact that maintenance of order and fairness rests primarily with the States." Id. at 519,
quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (1964).
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in sustaining a claim of the
privilege against self-incrimination before a subcommittee of the Kefauver Committee
despite the fact that the claim was really based upon a fear of state rather than federal
prosecution, adverted to this point in Marcello v. United States, 196 F.2d 437 (5th
Cir. 1952) : "It must be remembered also that, in our federal system, the administration
of criminal justice rests preponderantly with the states." Id. at 443.
139. 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas joined in the
dissent, and Justices Murphy and Rutledge agreed on this particular point.
140. For a fuller discussion, see Rogge, Williams v. Florida: End of a Theory
(pts. 1 & 2), 16 VILL. L. REv. 411, 607 (1971).
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use of the incorporation theory's makeshift double selective incorporation.
Instead of following history, the Court took three wrong turns
under the first amendment. The first two of these were the creation
of the sedition and obscenity exceptions. The framers of the first
amendment had no such exceptions in mind; rather they "sought,"
in the words of Professor Zechariah Chafee, "to preserve the fruits
of the old victory abolishing the censorship, and to achieve a new
victory abolishing sedition prosecutions." 14 ' There were no excep14 2
tions to this amendment.
Despite the first amendment's unqualified prohibitions, the United
States Supreme Court imported two exceptions into it: one for sedition; and another for obscenity. The Court sanctioned the sedition
exception in Schenck v. United States,'43 where Justice Holmes announced his clear and present danger test. The Court established the
obscenity exception in Roth v. United States and Alberts v. California,' decided together, where Justice Brennan determined that
material was obscene when it dealt with sex in a manner appealing
to "prurient interest," whatever that may mean. Thus there are currently two exceptions to the first amendment, while the writer feels
that historically there should be none. On the Court only Justices
Black and Douglas have been of the view that there are no exceptions
to the first amendment, and now Justice Douglas is the sole remaining proponent of this theory.
The third wrong turn taken by the Court was the use of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment to make the first amendment as fully applicable to the states as to the federal government.
Justice Brennan elucidated the end product of this selective incorporation theory in Malloy v. Hogan,4 ' a fifth amendment case:
Gitlow v. New York . . . initiated a series of decisions which
today hold immune from state invasion every First Amendment
protection for the cherished rights of mind and spirit the
freedoms of speech, press, religion, assembly, association, and
petition for redress of grievances.
[T]he guarantees of the First Amendment, . .. the prohibition
of unreasonable searches and seizures of the Fourth Amend141. Z.

CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES

22 (1941).

142. See O.J. ROGGE, THE FIRST AND THE FIFrH 12-34 (1960) ; Rogge, "Congress
Shall Make No Law ..."(pts. 1 & 2), 56 MICH. L. REV. 331, 579 (1958).
143. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
144. 354 U.S. 476 (1957), aff'g Roth v. United States, 237 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1956)
and People v. Alberts, 138 Cal. App. 2d 909, 292 P.2d 90 (Super. Ct. App. 1955).
145. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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ment . . . and the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment . .. are all to be enforced against the States under

the Fourteenth Amendment according to the same standards that
protect those personal rights against federal encroachment.'
Justice Brennan's statement in Malloy was the result of a long
line of cases 47 which developed from a misreading of a dictum of the
Court in Gitlow v. New York." 8 The Court in that case never said
that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment made the
first amenment applicable to the states. Justice Holmes, in a dissenting opinion in Gitlow in which Justice Brandeis joined, emphasized
this fact:
The general principle of free speech, it seems to me, must be
taken to be included in the Fourteenth Amendment, in view of
the scope that has been given to the word "liberty" as there used,
although perhaps it may be accepted with a somewhat larger
latitude of interpretation than is allowed to Congress by the
146. Id. at 5, 10 (footnote omitted). In Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 215 (1963), Justice Clark wrote for the Court:
First, this Court has decisively settled that the First Amendment's mandate
that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof" has been made wholly applicable to the States
by the Fourteenth Amendment.
147. E.g., Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 396-97 (1953) ("[t]he conclusion depends upon consideration of the principles of the First Amendment secured
against state abridgment by the Fourteenth") ; Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 309
(1952) ("the First Amendment which [by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment]
prohibits the states from establishing religion or prohibiting its free exercise");
McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 210 (1948) ("the First Amendment
[made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth]") ; Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 8 (1947) ("[t]he First Amendment, as made applicable to the states by the
Fourteenth") ; Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946) ("the principles of
the First Amendment, as adopted by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment") ; State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943) ("[i]n
weighing arguments of the parties it is important to distinguish between the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as an instrument for transmitting the
principles of the First Amendment and those cases in which it is applied for its own
sake ....

[Ilt is important to note that while it is the Fourteenth Amendment which

bears directly upon the State it is the more specific limiting principles of the First
Amendment that finally govern this case") ; Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105,
108 (1943) ("[t]he First Amendment, which the Fourteenth makes applicable to the
states") ; School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 593 (1940) ("[t]he First Amendment,
and the Fourteenth through its absorption of the First"), overruled in Board of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) ; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940)
("[t]he fundamental concept of liberty embodied in that Amendment [fourteenth]
embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment") ; Schneider v. Irvington,
308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939) ("[tlhe freedom of speech and of the press secured by the
First Amendment against abridgment by the United States is similarly secured to all
persons by the Fourteenth against abridgment by a state") ; United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) ("[tlhere may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be
within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth"). See also Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293 (1951) ("the ordinance is
clearly invalid as a prior restraint on the exercise of First Amendment rights").

148. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
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sweeping language that governs or ought to govern the laws of
the United States.149
In like manner in other cases, Chief Justice Hughes was consistently
careful not to say that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment made the first amendment applicable to the states.'5 0 So were
Justices Cardozo and Sutherland.'
Instead, they maintained that
the constitutional strictures placed upon the states emanated from
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment alone; the fact
that due process considerations may, in some instances, overlap first
amendment provisions did not mean that the entire first amendment
was incorporated in the due process clause of the fourteenth. However, their discriminating language apparently went generally unnoted.
Unfortunately the language in the Gitlow case lent itself to being
misunderstood. Persons could read into it whatever they wanted to
see there. A similar misreading occurred with respect to Justice
Holmes' language about shouting "fire" in a crowded theatre in
Schenck v. United States, 5 ' although with more justification than
in the instance of the language in the Gitlow case. Just as those who
wanted restrictions on speech cited Holmes' hypothetical case as a
prime illustration for their argument,'
so those who wanted the
149. Id. at 672 (Holmes & Brandeis, JJ., dissenting).
150. See, e.g., De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937) ; Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931) ; Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931). In
De Jonge, the Chief Justice stated:
Freedom of speech and of the press are fundamental rights which are safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution ....
The right of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of
free speech and free press and is equally fundamental. . . . The First Amendment of the Federal Constitution expressly guarantees that right against abridgment by Congress. But explicit mention there does not argue exclusion elsewhere.
For the right is one that cannot be denied without violating those fundamental
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all civil and political
institutions, principles which the Fourteenth Amendment embodies in the general
terms of its due process clause.

299 U.S. at 364.
151. Justice Cardozo, in the Court's opinion in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
324 (1937), stated:
[T]he due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment may make it unlawful
for a state to abridge by its statutes the freedom of speech which the First
Amendment safeguards against encroachment by the Congress . . . or the like
freedom of the press . . . . (Emphasis added.)
In the Court's opinion in Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243
(1936), Justice Sutherland wrote:
While ... [the first amendment] is not a restraint upon the powers of the states,
the states are precluded from abridging the freedom of speech or of the press by
force of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
152. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
153. What Justice Holmes actually said in the Schenck case was this: "The most
stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in
a theatre and causing a panic." Id. at 52. This is not speech. Shouting "fire" under
such circumstances is as much an act as firing a gun or lighting a fire. It is the
same as if by a shout one intentionally detonated an infernal machine. This is criminal
conduct; not speech.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1972

27

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 3 [1972], Art. 1

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

17 : p. 393

first amendment applicable to the states cited the Gitlow case as so
saying.
Before Gitlow, the Court in Patterson v. Colorado154 let stand
a contempt conviction for the publication of a cartoon and certain
articles which dealt with the Supreme Court of Colorado. In that
case, Justice Holmes speaking for the Court said: "We leave undecided the question whether there is to be found in the Fourteenth
Amendment a prohibition similar to that in the First."' 55 Still later
he and Justice Brandeis joined in the Court's opinion in Prudential
Insurance Co. v. Cheek,"'0 which stated:
[N]either the Fourteenth Amendment nor any other provision
of the Constitution of the United States imposes upon the States
any restrictions about "freedom of speech" or the "liberty of
silence ... .111
With reference to the change in views of Justices Holmes and
Brandeis in the three years between the Prudential Insurance Co. decision and their dissent in the Gitlow case, Justice Jackson, in his dissenting opinion in Beauharnais v. Illinois,5 8 commented:
However, these two Justices, who made the only original
contribution to legal thought on the difficult problems bound up
in these Amendments, soon reversed and took the view that the
Fourteenth Amendment did impose some restrictions upon the
States. But it was not premised upon the First Amendment nor
upon any theory that it was incorporated in the Fourteenth.' 59
In Beauharnais, the Court sustained the validity of an Illinois
group libel law. Justice Jackson, although dissenting, vigorously
rejected the incorporation theory:
The history of criminal libel in America convinces me that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not "incorporate" the First, that
the powers of Congress and of the States over this subject are
not of the same dimensions, and that because Congress probably
could100 not enact this law it does not follow that the States may
not.
He set forth with some emphasis the quoted language from the Holmes
and Brandeis dissent in Gitlow, and prefaced it with this comment:
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

205 U.S. 454 (1907).
Id. at 462.
259 U.S. 530 (1922).
Id. at 543.
343 U.S. 250 (1952).
Id. at 291 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 288.
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"What they wrote, with care and circumspection, I accept as the wise
and historically correct view of the Fourteenth Amendment."''
2.

Post Incorporation: Application of the First Amendment to the
Law of Obscenity

Despite the vigorous arguments of these Justices, the incorporation theory prevailed and in Roth v. United States,16 2 the Court not
only sustained the validity of federal as well as state obscenity legislation, but also used the same yardstick for state as well as federal
action. Within a decade and a half after this decision, the Supreme
Court became the "High Court of Obscenity," with 61 obscenity
cases on its 1970-1971 docket. The federal government and the Court,
as well as the states and their political subdivisions, were now all in
the business of protecting us from obscenity.
In Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day,'"" a federal case involving
three periodicals admittedly published for, and sexually arousing to,
homosexuals, Justice Harlan added to the prurient interest test the
requirement of patent offensiveness:
Obscenity under the federal statute thus requires proof of
two distinct elements: (1) patent offensiveness; and (2) "prurient interest" appeal. Both must conjoin before challenged material can be found "obscene" under §1461.164
Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 6 '
where the Court lifted an Ohio ban on the French film The Lovers
(Les Amants), expressed the view that the obscenity exception to
the first amendment was limited to hard-core pornography. He confessed to an inability to describe hard-core pornography, but added
that he knew it when he saw it. Other judges, however, have not
been certain of knowing hard-core pornography when they see it. 166
161. Id. at 291.
162. 354 U.S. 476 (1957), aff'g Roth v. United States, 237 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1956),
and People v. Alberts, 138 Cal. App. 2d 909, 292 P.2d 90 (Super. Ct. App. 1955). For
a fuller statement of the writer's views, see Rogge, supra note 84.
163. 370 U.S. 478 (1962), rev'g 289 F.2d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
164. Id. at 486.
165. 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964), rev'g 173 Ohio St. 22, 179 N.E.2d 777 (1962),
aff'g 115 Ohio App. 226, 175 N.E.2d 123 (1961).
166. In Haldeman v. United States, 340 F.2d 59 (10th Cir. 1965), where the
Tenth Circuit reversed a conviction for sending allegedly obscene booklets through
the mail, Circuit Judge John C. Pickett ina footnote to the court's opinion, after
quoting Justice Stewart's statement, continued:
The writer of this opinion has also felt that he would "know it when he saw it"
but a reading of some of the published material held to be constitutionally protected tends to raise doubts regarding one's perceptive abilities in such matters.
Id. at 62 n.6.
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In Memoirs v. Massachusetts,1 7 involving a book popularly
known as Fanny Hill, Justice Brennan, in an opinion in which Chief
Justice Warren and Justice Fortas joined, described three elements
that had to coalesce in order to make an item obscene. In one paragraph he wrote:
We defined obscenity in Roth in the following terms:
"[W]hether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a
whole appeals to prurient interest." 354 U.S. at 489. Under this
definition, as elaborated in subsequent cases, three elements must
coalesce: it must be established that (a) the dominant theme of the
material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b)
the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary
community standards relating to the description or representation
of sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value.' 68
Then in Redrup v. New York, 6 ' decided with Gent v. Arkansas
and Austin v. Kentucky, the Court in a per curiam opinion seemed to tie
together the various loose ends of its obscenity decisions. The Court first
pointed out that none of the state statutes involved was designed specifically for the protection of youth; and that in none of the cases was
there evidence of pandering:
In none of the cases was there a claim that the statute in question reflected a specific and limited state concern for juveniles. See
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 [(1943)] ; cf. Butler v.
Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 [(1957)]. In none was there any suggestion of an assault upon individual privacy by publication in
a manner so obtrusive as to make it impossible for an unwilling
individual to avoid exposure to it. Cf. Breard v. Alexandria, 341
U.S. 622 [(1951)]; Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S.
451 [(1952)]. And in none was there evidence of the sort of
"pandering" which the Court found significant in Ginzburg v.
United States, 383 U.S. 463 [(1966)]."'
Thereafter the Court made the significant observation that the
three ingredients for obscenity spelled out in Justice Brennan's opinion
in Fanny Hill, in which Chief Justice Warren and Justice Fortas
joined, added up to a concept which was "not dissimilar" from Justice
Stewart's concept of hard-core pornography:
167.
168.
169.
170.

383 U.S. 413 (1966), rev'g 349 Mass. 69, 206 N.E.2d 403 (1965).
Id. at 418.
386 U.S. 767 (1967).
Id. at 769.
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Two members of the Court [Justices Black and Douglas]
adhered to the view that a State is utterly without power to suppress, control, or punish the distribution of any writings or pictures upon the ground of their "obscenity." A third [Justice
Stewart] has held to the opinion that a State's power in this
area is narrowly limited to a distinct and clearly identifiable class
of material. Others [Chief Justice Warren and Justices Brennan
and Fortas] have subscribed to a not dissimilar standard, holding that a State may not constitutionally inhibit the distribution
of literary material as obscene unless "(a) the dominant theme
of the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest
in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts
contemporary community standards relating to the description
or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is
utterly without redeeming social value," emphasizing that the
"three elements must coalesce," and that no such material can
"be proscribed unless it is found to be utterly without redeeming
social value." Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418-19
[(1966)]. Another Justice [White] has not viewed the "social
value" element as an independent factor in the judgment of obscenity. Id. at 460-62 (dissenting opinion).'
Redrup, however, did not have an immediate effect; defendants in
cases decided shortly thereafter found little solace in that opinion
and as the Court mired itself deeper and deeper in the obscenity mess,
the complaints became harsher that it did not know what it was doing.
Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in Interstate Circuit, Inc. v.
Dallas, 12 one of the three obscenity cases"' in which the Court heard
argument at its 1967-68 term, commented:
As the Court enters this new area of obscenity law it is well
to take stock of where we are at present in this constitutional
field. The subject of obscenity has produced a variety of views
among the members of the Court unmatched in any other course
of constitutional adjudication ...
The upshot of all this divergence in viewpoint is that anyone who undertakes to examine the Court's decisions since Roth
which have held particular material 7obscene
or not obscene would
4
find himself in utter bewildermentY.

Judge Leo Weinrott of the Philadelphia Common Pleas Court,
who, after three days of hearings, had to decide the question whether
171. Id. at 770-71 (footnotes omitted).
172. 390 U.S. 676, 704 (1968) (concurring opinion).
173. The other two were Interstate Cir., Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968)
(separate case) ; and Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
174. Interstate Cir., Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704-05, 707 (footnotes omitted).
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Candy was obscene, and who delayed his decision until after he had
the help of the Supreme Court's rulings in Ginzburg, Fanny Hill and
Mishkin v. New York,' 5 found Candy to be obscene but specifically
declared that this was without any help from the Court, or, for that
matter, from the three days of hearings. Concerning the Court's efforts he commented: "The nine justices have yielded 14 separate
opinions pointing in various directions. Instead of intelligible guidelines we have confusion worse confounded."'7 0 The Pennsylvania
supreme court reversed Judge Weinrott's ruling on the ground that
Candy, although appealing to prurient interest, was not patently offensive. '7 However, Chief Justice Bell and Justice Musmanno, in
separate dissenting opinions, were even more caustic in their criticisms
of the Supreme Court than was Judge Weinrott. Chief Justice Bell
wrote:
The Supreme Court cannot define obscenity in language which
a majority of Judges, or of lawyers or of laymen understand.
However, notwithstanding the fact that it is high on the "best
sellers list" and its wide popularity, "Candy" is a very obscene,
dirty "sex" book without a single redeeming feature or the
slightest social value, and no matter what legal test is applied it
should be banned.1
Justice Musmanno was even more harsh in his comments:
The reason so many Justices gave no reason for their decisions is that there is no reason to the decisions. The decisions are
a conglomeration of personal views, individual tangents and private predilections, without much thought apparently being given
to the effect those decisions will have on the nation as a whole.
I state, again with disinclination, that the Supreme Court of the
United States has failed to live up to its solemn responsibility of
protecting, through a serious interpretation and firm enforcement,
of the laws of the land, the ramparts of moral standards, the
crumbling of which will bring disaster to our country. The Supreme Court has simply refused to meet its obligations in considering a grave situation which affects American youth, into
whose 7hands the destiny of our nation will one day be committed.'

175. 383 U.S. 502 (1966), aff'g 15 N.Y.2d 671, 204 N.E.2d 209, 255 N.Y.S.2d 881
(1964), aff'g 17 App. Div. 2d 243, 234 N.Y.S.2d 342 (1962), modifying and aff'g 26
Misc. 2d 152, 207 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1960).
176. Commonwealth v. Dell Publications, Inc., No. 3167 (C.P. Phila., June 9, 1966).
177. Commonwealth v. Dell Publications, Inc., 427 Pa. 189, 233 A.2d 840 (1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 948 (1968).
178. Id. at 223, 233 A.2d at 858 (footnotes omitted).
179. Id. at 231, 233 A.2d at 862.
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Senator John McClellan, in his argument in support of the Senate
resolution which condemned The Report on Obscenity and Pornography, declared that "during the past decade, the Supreme Court,
through a series of decisions, has emasculated, obfuscated and thrown
into a complete state of confusion, laws relating to obscene and pornographic material. 18 °
These criticisms are all true. The Court's obscenity opinions do
leave one in utter bewilderment; they do result in confusion worse
confounded. However, the criticisms are all unmerited, for it is impossible to describe obscenity.
Although Redrup itself did not immediately afford much stability to the law of obscenity, the writer hoped that, as the Court's
Redrup per curiam reversals mounted, there would be provided a solution of some sorts for the mess.' 8 ' This turned out not to be so.
3.

Intimations of Forthcoming Clarity: Retreat from the Incorporation Doctrine?

Subsequently, with the changes in the Court and with Justice
Stewart agreeing with Justice Harlan that Justice Black's incorporation theory was historically incorrect, it seemed that the Court might
retreat from its selective incorporation doctrines, at least in the area
of obscenity, and turn obscenity contests over to the states, subject
of course to the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
18 2
Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion in Williams v. Florida
and dissenting opinion in Baldwin v. New York,'"" expressed himself as
being in substantial agreement with justice Harlan, characterizing Justice Black's incorporation theory as "that erroneous constitutional doctrine."' 8 4 He also thought that Justice Harlan was surely right when
he said that "it is time for the Court to face up to reality."'8 5 In
addition, he wrote:
The "incorporation" theory postulates the Bill of Rights
as the substantive metes and bounds of the Fourteenth Amendment. I think this theory is incorrect as a matter of constitutional history, and that as a matter of constitutional law it is
both stultifying and unsound. It is, at best, a theory that can
lead the Court only to a Fourteenth Amendment dead end. And,
at worst, the spell of the theory's logic compels the Court either
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
183.

116 CONG. REC. S17904 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1970).
See Rogge, supra note 84.
399 U.S. 78, 143 (1970).
399 U.S. 66, 143 (1970).
Id. at 144.
Id. at 145.
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to impose intolerable restrictions upon the constitutional sovereignty of the individual States in the administration of their own
criminal law, or else intolerably to relax the explicit restrictions
that the Framers actually did put upon the Federal Government
in the administration of criminal justice.1 8 '
Thus, two Justices regarded Justice Black's incorporation theory
as historically incorrect. In addition, the two new members of the
Court, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, accepted Justice
Harlan's approach to federal-state relations, at least in part. For instance, in California v. Green,18 7 where the Court held that the confrontation clause in the sixth amendment does not preclude the introduction of an out-of-court declaration to prove the truth of the
matters asserted therein when that declaration was made under oath
and subject to cross-examination and when the declarant is available to testify at trial, Chief Justice Burger stated in his concurring
opinion:
I add this comment only to emphasize the importance of allowing the States to experiment and innovate, especially in the area
of criminal justice. If new standards and procedure are tried in
one State their success or failure will be a guide to others and to
the Congress.
* * * The circumstances of this case demonstrate again that
neither the Constitution as originally drafted, nor any amendment, nor indeed any need, dictates that we must have absolute
uniformity in the criminal law in all the States. Federal authority was never intended to be a8 "ramrod" to compel conformity
to nonconstitutional standards.1

In his dissenting opinion in Baldwin v. New York," s9 he complained:
I find it somewhat disconcerting that with the constant urging
to adjust ourselves to being a "pluralistic society" - and I accept this in its broad sense - we find constant pressure to conform to some uniform pattern on the theory that the Constitution commands it. 190
In Hoyt v. Minnesota,' a state obscenity case, Justice Blackmun, in a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Burger and Justice Harlan joined, wrote that he was in general agreement with
Justice Harlan's views in this area:
186. Id. at 143 (emphasis supplied by the Court).

187. 399 U.S. 149, 171 (1970).

188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. at 171-72.
399 U.S. 66 (1970).
Id. at 77.
399 U.S. 524 (1970).
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I am not persuaded that the First and Fourteenth Amendments necessarily prescribe a national and uniform measure rather than one capable of some flexibility and resting on concepts of reasonableness - of what each of our several States
constitutionally may do to regulate obscene products within its
borders.
At this still, for me, unsettled stage in the development of
state law of obscenity in the federal constitutional context I find
myself generally in accord with the views expressed by MR.
JUSTICE HARLAN in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 496,
500-03 (1957) ; Jacobellisv. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 203-04 (1964);
and Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 455, 458-60
(1966), and with those enunciated by THE CHIEF JUSTICE
in Cain v. Kentucky,
397 U.S. 319 (1970), and in Walker v.
12
Ohio, supra.'
To these circumstances must be added one other. Chief Justice
Burger, taking a position which makes a retreat from the incorporation doctrine all the more possible, is not so firmly committed to
stare decisis as is Justice Harlan. The Chief Justice, in his dissenting opinion in Coleman v. Alabamza,' 93 where the Court held that
the sixth and fourteenth amendments required counsel at an Alabama preliminary hearing, announced:
With deference, then, I am bound to reject categorically
MR.

JUSTICE HARLAN'S

and MR.

JUSTICE WHITE'S

thesis that

what the Court said lately controls over the Constitution. While
our holdings are entitled to deference I will not join in employing recent cases rather than the Constitution, to bootstrap
ourselves into a result, even though I agree with the objective
of having counsel at preliminary hearings. By placing a premium on "recent cases" rather than the language of the Constitution, the Court makes it dangerously simple for future
192. Id. at 524-25. In Walker v. Ohio, 398 U.S. 434 (1970), Chief Justice Burger
in dissent wrote:
I dissent from such a summary disposition, not only for the reasons expressed
in my separate opinion in Cain v. Kentucky, 397 U.S. 319 (1970), but also because
I find no justification, constitutional or otherwise, for this Court's assuming the
role of a supreme and unreviewable board of censorship for the 50 States, subjectively judging each piece of material brought before it without regard to the

findings or conclusions of other courts, state or federal. That is not one of the
purposes for which this Court was established.
Id. at 524.
In Cain v. Kentucky, 397 U.S. 319 (1970). Chief Justice Burger, in dissent
once again, stated:
In my view we should not inflexibly deny to each of the States,. the power
to adopt and enforce its own standards as to obscenity and pornographic materials;
States ought to be free to deal with varying conditions and problems in this area.
I am unwilling to say that Kentucky is without power to bar public showing of
this film; therefore, I would affirm the judgment from which the appeal is taken.

193. 399 U.S. 1, 21 (1970).
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Courts, using the technique of interpretation,
to operate as a
1 94
"continuing Constitutional convention.'

Indeed, even Justice Harlan himself has weakened on stare
decisis insofar as the constitutional pronouncements on the form of
jury trials of Duncan v. Louisiana 95 is concerned. In his opinion
dissenting in Baldwin v. New York' 6 and concurring in Williams
v. Florida,117 he wrote:

In taking that course in Baldwin, I cannot, in a matter that
goes to the very pulse of sound constitutional adjudication,
consider myself constricted by stare decisis.
The principle of stare decisis is multifaceted. It is a solid
foundation for our legal system; yet care must be taken not to
use it to create an unmovable structure. It provides the stability and predictability required for the ordering of human
affairs over the course of time and a basis of "public faith in
the judiciary as a source of impersonal and reasoned judgments." . . . Woodenly applied, however, it builds a stockade

of precedent that confines the law by rules, ill-conceived when
promulgated, or if sound in origin, unadaptable to present circumstances. No precedent is sacrosanct and one should not
hesitate to vote to overturn this Court's previous holdings old or recent - or reconsider settled dicta where the principles
announced prove either practically .
longer suited to contemporary life .

.
.

.
.

unworkable, or no
. Indeed, it is these

considerations that move me to depart today from the framework of Duncan. It is, in part, the disregard of stare decisis
in circumstances where it should apply, to which the Court is,
of necessity, driven in Williams by the "incorporation" doctrine,
that leads me to decline to follow Duncan. Surely if the principle of stare decisis means anything in the law, it means that
precedent should not be jettisoned when the rule of yesterday
remains viable, creates no injustice, and can reasonably be said
to be no less sound than the rule sponsored by those who seek
change, let alone incapable of being demonstrated wrong. The
decision in Williams, however, casts aside workability and relevance and substitutes uncertainty. The only reason I can discern for today's decision that discards numerous judicial pronouncements and historical precedent that sound constitutional
interpretation would look to as controlling, is the Court's disquietude with the tension between the jurisprudential consequences wrought by "incorporation" in Duncan and Baldwin
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id. at 22-23.
391 U.S. 145, 171 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
399 U.S. 66, 117 (1970).
399 U.S. 78, 117 (1970).
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and the counter-pulls of the situation in Williams which presents the prospect of invalidating the common practice in the
States of providing less
than a 12-member jury for the trial
19 8
of misdemeanor cases.

As one amassed these circumstances - the historical incorrectness of the incorporation theory; two Justices, Harlan and Stewart,
who recognized the historical incorrectness of the incorporation theory;
a Chief Justice, Burger, who shares Justice Harlan's approach to
federal-state relations; two Justices, Burger and Blackmun, who
are in general agreement with Justice Harlan's views in state obscenity cases; a Chief Justice, Burger, who is not so firmly committed to stare decisis as is Justice Harlan; and Justice Harlan
himself weakening in his views on stare decisis on the issue of jury
trials in state criminal cases - one began to have hope that the
Court would abandon selective incorporation along with the incorporation theory and return to a case-by-case application of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.' 9 9
However, at the 1970 term, even Justice Harlan began to write
like an incorporationist in the first amendment area. He did so, for
instance, in his dissenting opinion in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc.,2°0 a diversity action under Pennsylvania libel law; he explained
in a footnote:
Of course, for me, this case presents a Fourteenth, not a
purely First Amendment issue, for the question is one of the
constitutionality of the applicable Pennsylvania libel laws. However, I have found it convenient, in the course of this opinion,
occasionally to speak directly of the First Amendment as a
shorthand phrase for identifying those constitutional values of
freedom of expression guaranteed to individuals by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 20 '
Furthermore, the question of whether Justice Harlan would have
maintained his anti-incorporationist position and exerted an influence in redirecting the Court has become moot with his departure.
198. Id. at 118, 127-29 (footnote omitted). In Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112
(1970), where the Court held that the provisions of the Voting Rights Acts Amendments of 1970 fixing the voting age at 18 are constitutional in national elections but
not in state and local elections, Justice Harlan, who felt that these provisions were
unconstitutional even as to national elections, stated with reference to the Court's oneman one-vote course which began with Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962):
Concluding, as I have, that such decisions cannot withstand constitutional
scrutiny, I think it my duty to depart from them, rather than to lend my support
to perpetuating their constitutional error in the name of stare decisis.
400 U.S. at 218 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
199. See generally Rogge, A Technique For Change, 11 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 481
(1964) ; Rogge, supra note 140.
200. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
201. Id. at 63 n.1 (dissenting opinion).
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Invoking Due Process

Further reflection suggested that perhaps the best way for the
courts to get out of their obscenity muddle lay in the due process
clauses of the fifth amendment as to federal action and of the fourteenth amendment as to state action. The courts should simply hold
that consenting adults have the due process right to read, see, or
hear whatever they like. Such a course would bypass the necessity
of taking a position on the Court's incorporation doctrines. Such a
course would also mean that the Court could use the same yardstick
for state as for federal action, for the benefit of those who regard
that fact as an advantage.
The Court went part way in this direction in its many Redrup
and comparable rulings." Justice Stewart's concept of hard-core
pornography, behind which the Court seemed to have united in its
Redrup rulings, is not a big step from the position that consenting
adults have the due process right to read, see, hear or obtain pornography. The Court went further in this direction when it held in
Stanley v. Georgia. that an adult had the right to the private possession of pornography. The Second Circuit applied Stanley in
United States v. Dellapia.° . to reach the conclusion that consenting adults had the right to use the mail for the transmission of pornography. A federal three-judge district court in Massachusetts in
Karalexis v. Byrne2" applied Stanley in order to hold that paying
adults had a right to see pornography. However, the Court itself
did not go this far, vacating the decision and remanding the case to the
state court for reconsideration.
To, hold that consenting adults have a due process right to read,
see, hear or obtain pornography still leaves ample room for the protection of privacy as well as the protection of youth. As the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography wrote in one paragraph of
its Report:
In general outline, the Commission recommends that federal,
state, and local legislation should not seek to interfere with the
right of adults who wish to do so to read, obtain, or view
explicit sexual materials. On the other hand, we recommend
legislative regulations upon the sale of sexual materials to young
persons who do not have the consent of their parents, and we
also recommend legislation to protect persons from having sexual
202.
203.
204.
205.

See
394
433
306

Appendices II & III infra.
U.S. 557 (1969).
F.2d 1252 (2d Cir. 1970).
F. Supp. 1363 (D. Mass. 1969), vacated and remanded, 401 U.S. 216

(1971).
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materials thrust upon them without their consent through the mails
or through open public display.2" 6
The Postal Reorganization Act,20 7 enacted in 1970, is in conformity with these recommendations, with a section prohibiting pandering advertisements, and two sections dealing with the mailing of
sexually oriented advertisements. 20° The predecessor of the section
prohibiting pandering advertisements was adopted in December 1967i
the year the Court decided Redrup. Its constitutionality was sustained
in Rowan v. Post Office Dep't.2°" A federal three-judge court in
Brooklyn, in Pent-R-Books, Inc. v. United States Postal Service,1 0
sustained the validity of the two sections dealing with the mailing of
sexually oriented advertisements.
On the state level, New York, following a recommendation of
the federal Commission on Obscenity and Pornography, passed an act
which went into effect September 1, 1971, that made the public display of offensive sexual material an offense.2"'
As for the protection of youth, here we can go overboard. Those
who favor obscenity legislation for children can piously point to a
line of authorities going back more than 2000 years. They can begin
their case with Socrates and Plato, who were for the expurgation of
Homer and the other poets as well, and for the protection of youth.21 2
They can proceed, chronologically, to the words of Jesus, as related
in three of the four Gospels, those of Matthew, Mark, and Luke.2"'
According to St. Matthew, Jesus called a little child to him, set him
in the midst of his disciples, and said: "But whoso shall offend one
of these little ones that believe in me, it were better for him that a
millstone were hanged about his neck, and he were drowned in the
'
depth of the sea." 214
From Jesus, they can go to that champion of liberty, John Stuart
Mill, who specifically excluded children from the freedom which he
advocated for adults. In 1859, Mill, in his On Liberty, wrote:
It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant
to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties.
206.

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION

ON

OBSCENITY AND

PORNOGRAPHY

207. 39 U.S.C. §§ 3001 et seq. (Supp. 1971).
208. 48 Stat. 784 (1970), 39 U.S.C. §§ 3008, 3010, 3011 (Supp. 1971).
209. 397 U.S. 728 (1970), aff'g 300 F. Supp. 1038 (C.D. Cal. 1969).

51 (1970).

210. 328 F. Supp. 297 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
211. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 245.10, 245.11 (McKinney's Sess. Laws 1971). How-

ever, this act may be invalid for overbreadth. See, e.g., Winters v. New York, 333
U.S. 507 (1948), re'lg 294 N.Y. 545, 63 N.E.2d 98 (1945). But see People v. Lou
Bern Broadway, Inc., N.Y.L.J., Nov. 10, 1971, at 17, col. 8 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct.),
There, judge Irving Lang held the statute to be constitutional. The case is on appeal
to the Appellate Term.
212. Republic, bks. II & III (Rouse transl. 1906).

213. Matthew 18:6; Mark 9:42; Luke 17:2 (King James).
214. Matthew 18:6 (King James).
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We are not speaking of children, or of young persons below the
age which the law may fix as that of manhood or womanhood.
Those who are still in a state to require being taken care of by
others, must be protected
against their own actions as well as
215
against external injury.
Then they can come to some of the many modern experts, such
as FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, Dr. Frederic Wertham, Cardinal
Spellman, and various congressional and legislative committees, subcommittees, and commissions.
One of the first intimations that the Court might adhere to these
historical precedents occurred in Jacobellis v. Ohio,216 where Justice
Brennan suggested legislative protection for children and Chief Justice Warren manifested an attitude consistent with such legislation.
Justice Brennan wrote:
State and local authorities might well consider whether their objectives in this area would be better served by laws aimed specifically at preventing distribution of objectionable material to
children, rather than at totally prohibiting its dissemination.2 17
In his dissenting opinion, the Chief Justice wrote:
In my opinion, the use to which various materials are put
not just the words and pictures themselves - must be considered in determining whether or not the materials are obscene. A
technical or legal treatise on pornography may well be inoffensive under most circumstances but, at the same time,
"obscene"
218
in the extreme when sold or displayed to children.
Earlier the Chief Justice had expressed this same idea in a different form in his concurring opinion in the companion cases of Roth
v. United States and Alberts v. California:211
It is not the book that is on trial; it is a person. The conduct of
the defendant is the central issue, not the obscenity of a book or
picture. The nature of the materials is, of course, relevant as an
attribute of the defendant's conduct, but the materials are thus
215. J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 15 (Oxford Univ. Press ed. 1868), quoted in People
v. Bookcase, Inc., 14 N.Y.2d 409, 422-23, 201 N.E.2d 14, 22, 252 N.Y.S.2d 433, 444
(1964) (Burke, J., dissenting). There, the court invalidated a New York statutory
provision which prohibited the sale to a minor of "any book . . . the cover or contents
of which exploits, is devoted to, or is principally made up of descriptions of illicit sex
or sexual immorality." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 484(h) (McKinney Supp. 1963). The
book was John Cleland's Fanny Hill.
216. 378 U.S. 184 (1964), rev'g 173 Ohio St. 22, 179 N.E.2d 777 (1962), aff'g
115 Ohio App. 226, 175 N.E.2d 123 (1961).
217. Id. at 195.
218. Id. at 201 (footnote omitted).
219. 354 U.S. 476, 494 (1957), aff'g Roth v. United States, 237 F.2d 796 (2d Cir.
1956), and People v. Alberts, 138 Cal. App. 2d 909, 292 P.2d 90 (Super. Ct. App. 1955).
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placed in context from which they draw color and character. 22A0
wholly different result might be reached in a different setting.
This point was also raised in Chief Justice Warren's dissenting opinion in Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown,221 decided the same day as
Roth and Alberts, where the Court upheld by a five-to-four vote a
New York statute providing for civil non-jury injunctive proceedings against obscene publications:
It is the manner of use that should determine obscenity. It
is the conduct of the individual that should be judged, not the
quality of art or literature. To do otherwise is to impose a prior
restraint and hence to violate the Constitution. 22
Other courts have also recognized the special position of legis22
lation aimed at protecting youth. For example, in State v. Settle, 1
the Rhode Island supreme court upheld a statute which prohibited the
sale of pornographic material to any person under eighteen years of
age. The statute contained the words "or is principally made up of
descriptions of illicit sex or sexual immorality," followed by the phrase
"or which is obscene." The Rhode Island court, by construction, confined the statute before it to obscenity. It characterized the words
preceding the phrase as "nothing more than examples of what is obscene, ' 224 and quoted the statute's preamble that the materials proscribed by it "are a contributing factor to juvenile crime, a basic factor
in impairing the ethical and moral development of our youth and a
clear and present danger to the people of the state."22 '
The New York court of appeals, however, demonstrated once
again that contradictory results are to be expected in the area of obscenity, where the blind appear to lead the blind. In People v. Bookcase, Inc.,220 that court had before it the question of validity of a

statute which was substantially similar to Rhode Island's and con220. Id. at 495.
221. 354 U.S. 436, 445 (1957), aff'g 1 N.Y.2d 177, 134 N.E.2d 461, 151 N.Y.S.2d

639 (1956), aff'g 208 Misc. 150, 142 N.Y.S.2d 735 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
222. Id. at 446.
223. 90 R.I. 195, 156 A.2d 921 (1959). See also Matthews v. State, 99 So. 2d 568
(Fla. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 918 (1958), where the state of Florida, relying on
a statute similar to the one struck down by the Supreme Court in Butler v. Michigan,
352 U.S. 380 (1957), when applied to adults, convicted a defendant of showing
obscene pictures to a 12 year-old girl.
In Attorney Gen. v. Memoirs, 349 Mass. 69, 206 N.E.2d 403 (1965), rev'd,
383 U.S. 413 (1966), in which the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts by a
four-to-three vote held Fanny Hill to be obscene, Justice Cutter, although dissenting,
nevertheless felt that "it could reasonably be found that distribution of the book to
persons under the age of eighteen would be [a] violation of G.L. c.272, § 28, as tending
to corrupt the morals of youth." Id. at 76, 206 N.E.2d at 408 (footnote omitted).
224. 90 R.I. at 199, 156 A.2d at 924.
225. Id. at 198, 156 A.2d at 924.
226. 14 N.Y.2d 409, 423, 201 N.E.2d 14, 22, 252 N.Y.S.2d 433, 444 (1964).
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tained those portions quoted above. Nevertheless, the court did not
construe the statute so as to limit its operation to obscenity; consequently, it was held void for vagueness.
The Model Penal Code, which the Justices of the Supreme Court
have repeatedly cited and quoted with approval, has a comparable
child protection provision. Section 251.4(1) of the 1962 Proposed
Official Draft contains this sentence in its definition of obscenity:
Predominant appeal shall be judged with reference to ordinary
adults unless it appears from the character of the material or the
circumstances of its dissemination to be designed for children or
other specially susceptible audience.2 2T
Section 251.4(4) adds that:
[E]vidence shall be admissible to show:
(b) what the predominant appeal of the material would be for
ordinary adults or any special audience to which it was directed,
and what effect, if any, it would probably have on conduct of
such people.22
However, this general acceptance of the states' power to prohibit the distribution of obscene materials to minors does not mean
the states are free to enact whatever legislation they deem proper. As
shown by the Bookcase decision, obscenity legislation, even if applicable only to children, must be reasonably definite. This results
from the general due process requirement imposed by the fifth and
fourteenth amendments on all legislation, whether federal or state,
civil or criminal. And, of course, the standards of certainty are more
exacting for statutes with criminal sanctions than for those with civil
ones only. As the Supreme Court announced through Chief Justice
Waite many years ago in United States v. Reese:229 "Every man
should be able to know with certainty when he is committing a
crime.' 230 Or, as the Court ruled more recently in an opinion by
Justice Reed in Winters v. New York: 2 11 "The crime 'must be defined
with appropriate definiteness.' . . . There must be ascertainable
standards of guilt. Men of common intelligence cannot be required
to guess at the meaning of the enactment.''

2 2
3

In addition, a criminal statute applicable to utterances must be
particularly clear and precise. If it might encompass a protected form
227. MOD.L PENAL CODE § 251.4(1) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
228. Id. § 251.4(4).
229. 92 U.S.214 (1875).
230. Id. at 220.

231. 333 U.S. 507 (1948), rev'g 294 N.Y. 545, 63 N.E.2d 98 (1945)..
232. Id. at 515.
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of expression as well as unprotected ones, it must fall. As Justice
Reed stated further:

It is settled that a statute so vague and indefinite, in form and
as interpreted, as to permit within the scope of its language the
punishment of incidents fairly within the protection of the guarantee of free speech is void, on its face, as contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 3
In view of these strict requirements, it is not surprising that the Court
has invalidated or cast doubt on much state and local legislation dealing with obscenity and related matters.23 4
Adjudications involving the New York statutory provisions for
the protection of youth furnish an interesting illustration. In People

v. Bookcase, Inc.,

5

involving the sale of a copy of Fanny Hill to a

16-year-old girl, the New York court of appeals by a four-to-three
233. Id. at 509; accord, Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Herndon v.
Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937) ; Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) ; see
Collings, Unconstitutional Uncertainty - An Appraisal, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 195, 214-18
(1955); Note, Due Process Requirements of Definiteness in Statutes, 62 HARV. L.
REV. 77, 85--86 (1948); Note, Inseparability in Application of Statutes Impairing
Civil Liberties, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1208 (1948).
234. See, e.g., Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Board of Regents, 360 U.S. 684
(1959), rev'g 4 N.Y.2d 349, 151 N.E.2d 197, 175 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1958), rev'g 4 App.
Div. 2d 348, 165 N.Y.S.2d 681 (1957) (striking down those provisions of New York's
motion picture licensing law which prohibit the licensing of any film "which portrays
acts of sexual immorality ... as desirable, acceptable or proper patterns of behavior") ;
Holmby Prods., Inc. v. Vaughn, 350 U.S. 870, rev'g per curiam 177 Kan. 728, 282
P.2d 412 (1955) (reversing a denial of injuctive relief under a state statute using the
words "cruel, obscene, indecent or immoral") ; Superior Films, Inc. v. Department
of Educ., 346 U.S. 587 (1954), rev'g 159 Ohio St. 315, 112 N.E.2d 311 (1953), and
Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Board of Regents, 305 N.Y. 336, 113 N.E.2d 502 (1953)
(invalidating an Ohio statute using the words "moral, educational or amusing and
harmless character" and striking down a New York statute using the word "immoral") ; Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960, rev'g 157 Tex. Crim. 516, 247 S.W.2d 95
(1952) (invalidating an ordinance using the words "prejudicial to the best interests of
the people") ; Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952), rev'g 303 N.Y.
242, 101 N.E.2d 665 (1951)
(invalidating a New York statute using the word
"sacrilegious") ; Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948), rev'g 294 N.Y. 545, 63
N.E.2d 98 (1945) (striking down a New York statute which, as construed, applied
to "massed" stories of bloodshed and lust).
In an earlier decision, Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230
(1915), the Court in approving the same language which it later invalidated in
Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of Educ., expressed the view that motion pictures
were not entitled to the same measure of protection as other forms of utterance. In
the Burstyn case, the Court overruled its earlier position. This result was forecast
in United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948), where the
Court said: "We have no doubt that moving pictures, like newspapers and radio, are
included in the press whose freedom is guaranteed by the First Amendment."
See also Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964), rev'g 215 F. Supp. 439
(W.D. Wash. 1963) (holding unconstitutional Washington loyalty oath statutes);
Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961), rev'g 125 So. 2d 554 (Fla.
1960) (attacking a Florida loyalty oath statute) ; Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95 (1948),
vacating 110 Utah 534, 175 P.2d 724 (1946) (vacating a judgment under a Utah
statute which made it an offense to conspire to commit any action "injurious to
public morals").
235. 14 N.Y.2d 409, 201 N.E.2d 14, 252 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1964). In a companion
case, Larkin v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 14 N.Y.2d 399, 200 N.E.2d 760, 2"2 N.Y.S.2d 71
(1964), the court, again by a vote of four-three, held that Fanny Hill was not obscene.
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vote struck down section 484(h) of the New York Penal Law, 286 which
prohibited the sale to a minor under eighteen years of age of "any
book . . . the cover or contents of which exploits, is devoted to, or is
principally made up of descriptions of illicit sex or sexual immorality," on the ground that the language was too vague for a criminal
statute and thus violated the fourteenth amendment. 3 7
Subsequently, in People v. Kahan,2 8 the prosecution argued that
there remained enough in old section 484(h) to support another test:
that of "exploitation for commercial gain." Despite the fact that the
court was unpersuaded by this argument and, by a four-to-three vote,
abided by its decision in Bookcase, it was pointed out in the per
curiam opinion that:
The decision in People v. Bookcase, Inc. implied that a constitutionally valid statute defining obscenity in its impact on the
young, as distinguished from obscenity in respect of adults,
might emerge under careful draftsmanship. We find defects in
draftsmanship of section 484-h of the Penal Law which seem
to be remediable both in respect of its substantive definitions
and in respect of scienter as to contents and the age of the customer.239
In a concurring opinion Judge Fuld added:
While the supervision of children's reading may best be left
to their parents, the knowledge that parental control or guidance
cannot always be provided and society's transcendent interest
in protecting the welfare of children justify reasonable regulation of the sale of material to them. It is, therefore, altogether
fitting and proper for a state to include in a statute designed to
regulate the sale of pornography to children special standards,
broader than those embodied in legislation aimed at controlling
dissemination of such material to adults. And I have no doubt
that such a law, punishing the sale or distribution to children
of matter deemed objectionable, under criteria that would not be
permissible if applied to adults, may be drafted so as not to violate the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression.240
236. N.Y. PENAL CODE § 484(h) (McKinney 1965).
237. 14 N.Y.2d at 411-12, 201 N.E.2d at 15, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 434-35; accord,
People v. Kaplan, 252 N.Y.S.2d 927 (N.Y. County Crim. Ct. 1964). In State v.
Pocras, 166 Neb. 642, 90 N.W.2d 263 (1958), the Nebraska supreme court upset an
obscenity ordinance of the city of Lincoln on the ground that the words "or dispose of
in any manner" in the ordinance made it void for uncertainty. In State v. Christine,
239 La. 259, 118 So. 2d 403 (1960), involving Lilly Christine, also know as the Cat
Girl, the Louisiana supreme court invalidated as unconstitutionally indefinite a statute
which proscribed as obscene the performance "in any public place or in any public
manner, of any act of lewdness or indecency, grossly scandalous and tending to
debauch the morals and manners of the people." In State v. Locks, 97 Ariz. 148, 397
P.2d 949 (1964), the words "obscene or indecent" were held impermissibly vague in
the absence of any statutory definition.
238. 15 N.Y.2d 311, 206 N.E.2d 333, 258 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1965).
239. Id. at 311-12, 206 N.E.2d at 334, 258 N.Y.S.2d at 392 (citations omitted).
240. Id. at 312, 206 N.E.2d at 334-35, 258 N.Y.S.2d at 392.
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The result was the passage in 1965 of two new statutes - sections 484(h) and 484(i). Section 484(h), drafted with the aid of
the district attorney's office of New York County, made it an offense
knowingly to sell to a minor under seventeen years of age material
showing a "visual representation or image of a person or portion of
the human body which depicts nudity, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse and which is harmful to minors," or containing "explicit and detailed verbal descriptions or narrative accounts of sexual
excitement, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse and which, taken
as a whole, is harmful to minors." Material "harmful to minors" was
defined to mean that material which:
(i) predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful or morbid
interest of minors, and
(ii) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult
community as a whole with respect to what is suitable material
for minors, and
(iii) is utterly without redeeming social importance for minors. 4 '
In approving the measure, Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller stated:
Recently, the courts have indicated that society's transcendent interest in protecting the welfare of children leaves some room for sustaining carefully drawn legislation. This bill, which appears to meet
every constitutional test imposed by the courts, will be an invaluable
weapon in the hands of
parents and law enforcement officers alike in
242
the fight for decency.

Section 484(i) made it illegal to sell to a minor under eighteen
years of age material which would appeal "to the lust of persons under
the age of eighteen years or to their curiosity as to sex or to the anatomical differences between the sexes.

'243

Apparently for good measure,

the Governor also signed this bill.
In Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick,2" the New York court of appeals sustained the constitutionality of both new sections against a
challenge that the "distinction on the basis of age is an unconstitutional infringement upon freedom of the press." Judge Keating
wrote for the court:
The decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States and of
this court have indicated that a concept of variable obscenity for
the protection of children, in a properly drawn statute, is not
241. N.Y.

PENAL CODE §

484(h) (McKinney 1965).

242. McKinney's N.Y. Laws 1965, 2101.
243. N.Y. PENAL CODE § 484(i) (McKinney 1965).
244. 18 N.Y.2d 71, 218 N.E.2d 668, 271 N.Y.S.2d 947, appeal dismissed sub norm.
Bookcase, Inc. v. Leary, 385 U.S. 12, aff'g 49 Misc. 2d 355, 267 N.Y.S.2d 415 (Sup.

Ct. 1966).
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only within the power of our Legislature but is a desirable and
even necessary provision. The statutes in question embody that
concept and we uphold the validity of such a concept. "45
To substantiate the existence of this concept, Judge Keating quoted
from the opinions of Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan in
Jacobellis. He further noted the legislative finding in section 484(e)
of the New York Penal Law that obscene literature is "a contributing
factor to juvenile crime, a basic factor in impairing the ethical and
moral development of our youth and a clear and present danger to
the people of the state.

'240

In People v. Tannenbaum,4 7 the New York court, by a fourto-three vote, sustained a conviction under section 484(i) for the
sale of an issue of the magazine Candid to a 17-year-old youth. The
dissenters -

Judges Fuld, Van Voorhis, and Bergan

-

took the

broad. 4" 8

position that section 484(i) was unconstitutionally
In both Broderick and Tannenbaum, the Supreme Court denied
review. As usual in obscenity cases, the Justices expressed widely
divergent views. In Broderick, the Court dismissed the appeal for
want of a properly presented federal question. 24 Justices Harlan and
Brennan were of the opinion that the appeal should be dismissed
for want of a substantial federal question, while Justices Black and
White felt that probable jurisdiction should be noted. In Tannenbaum, the Court dismissed the appeal as moot,2 50 Chief Justice Warren
and Justice Douglas dissenting separately, and Justice Brennan voting
for reversal.
The New York statutes, and also a Dallas ordinance, came before the Supreme Court in three of the obscenity cases it decided at
its 1967-1968 term. The cases were Ginsberg v. New York,25 and
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, decided with United Artists Corp.
v. Dallas.252 The appellant in the first case was Sam Ginsberg, to be
245. Id. at 73, 218 N.E.2d at 670, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 950. Some writers have
described the concept which declares material obscene under certain circumstances
but not in others as "variable obscenity." See, e.g., Gerber, A Suggested Solution
to the Riddle of Obscenity, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 834, 847-52 (1964) ; Lockhart &
McClure, Censorship of Obscenity; The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45
MINN. L. REV. 5, 68-88 (1960) ; Lockhart & McClure, Literature, The Law of
Obscenity, and the Constitution, 38 MINN. L. REV. 295, 338-42 (1954).
246. 18 N.Y.2d at 73, 218 N.E.2d at 670, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
247. 18 N.Y.2d 268, 220 N.E.2d 783, 274 N.Y.S.2d 131 (1966), appeal dismissed,

388 U.S. 439 (1967).
248. Id. at 275, 220 N.E.2d at 788, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 138.

249. Bookcase, Inc. v. Leary, 385 U.S. 12 (1966).
250. People v. Tannebaum, 388 U.S. 439 (1967).
251. 390 U.S. 629 (1968) ; accord, Universal Film Exchange, Inc. v. Chicago, 288
F. Supp. 286 (N.D. Ill. 1968) (upholding Chicago's new motion picture censorship
ordinance requiring a permit if the audience was to include persons under 18 years
of age).
252. 390 U.S. 676 (1968), rev'g 402 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1966).
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distinguished from Allen Ginsberg, the American poet, and Ralph
Sam GinsGinzburg, the defendant in Ginzburg v. United States.5
berg and his wife operated a luncheonette which offered magazines
for sale. In order to make possible Ginsberg's prosecution, a mother
had her 16-year-old son enter the luncheonette and buy two girlie
magazines. One of them was Sir, which was held not obscene in a
previous action, Gent v. Arkansas."4 Nevertheless, Ginsberg was
prosecuted and convicted under section 484(h). The latter two cases
were appeals from the same Texas state court, challenged the same
Dallas ordinance, and concerned the same motion picture (Viva
Maria).
In the words of Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Ginsberg
and his dissenting opinion in the other two cases, the issue before
the Court was: "[M]ay a State prevent the dissemination of obscene or other obnoxious material to juveniles upon standards less
stringent than those which would govern its distribution to adults ?""
The Court answered the question in the affirmative, but imposed the
requirement that the legislation be sufficiently specific in scope. Using
this criterion, the Court sustained the statute in Ginsberg and at the
same time held the Dallas ordinance unconstitutionally vague.
In upholding the constitutionality of section 484(h), the Court
adopted the concept of variable obscenity.25 To emphasize the widespread acceptance of this idea, Justice Brennan listed the youth-protective provisions contained in the obscenity laws of 35 other states.25 7
Justices Harlan and Stewart concurred separately in the decision,
while Justice Douglas was joined by Justice Black in dissent. After
indicating a willingness to reverse the judgment on the basis of
Redrup,2"s Justice Douglas restated his belief that there is no obscenity exception to the first amendment. Justice Fortas wrote a dissenting opinion which urged reversal on the basis of Redrup and
Ginzburg v. United States.259
Later in the 1967-1968 term, in Rabeck v. New York, 2 0 the
Court held that the standard in section 484(i) was unconstitutionally
vague, even though the section had been repealed a short time before.261 Justice Douglas, with whom justice Black concurred, would
253. 383 U.S. 463 (1966), aff'g 338 F.2d 12 (3d Cir. 1964), aff'g 224 F. Supp. 129
(E.D. Pa. 1963).
254. 386 U.S. 767 (1967).
255. 390 U.S. at 704.
256. See note 245 and accompanying text supra.
257. 390 U.S. at 647-48.
258. Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967).
259. 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
260. 391 U.S. 462 (1968).
261. On September 1, 1967, New York put into effect a revision of its Penal Law
whereby section 484(h) became sections 235.20 to 235.22; section 484(i) was repealed.
Ch. 791, § 33 (McKinney 1967).
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have reversed for the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in
Ginsberg. Justice Harlan would have affirmed, relying on his dissenting opinion in Interstate Circuit.26 In addition, he considered
it "a particularly fruitless judicial act to strike down on the score of
vagueness a state statute which has already been repealed." 26' 3
The other youth-protective provision considered by the Court,
the Dallas movie censorship ordinance, required the classification of
films as either "suitable" or "not suitable" for "young persons." In
Interstate Circuit, the Supreme Court, while reiterating its position
that a "State may regulate the dissemination to juveniles of, and their
access to, material objectionable as to them, but which a State clearly
could not regulate as to adults,"264 nevertheless held the ordinance invalid because the standards governing the classification of unsuit2 65
ability were too vague.

At the same time that Interstate Circuit was making its way from
the Texas state courts to the Supreme Court, the same Dallas ordinance was the subject of litigation in the federal courts. In the first
federal action,266 District Judge Hughes invalidated the ordinance on
the ground that it failed to provide for prompt judicial review as
required by Freedman v. Maryland."'7 However, she harbored no
doubts about the validity of such legislation, provided it was carefully
drawn:
The States' authority over children's activities is broader than
over like activities of adults, and the fact that certain films are
not obscene under the Supreme Court definition in Roth and
affirmed in Jacobellis does not necessarily render them not obscene when viewed by an audience of young persons, as defined
in . . . the Ordinance, so as to protect26 8them under the First
Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
262. Interstate Cir., Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704 (1968).
263. 391 U.S. at 463.
264. 390 U.S. at 690.

265. Id. at 689-90. In Paramount Film Distrib. Corp. v. Chicago, 172 F. Supp. 69
(N.D. Ill. 1959), involving the motion picture Desire Under the Elms, the court held
that a Chicago ordinance was hopelessly indefinite in its reference to any film that

"tends to create a harmful impression on the minds of children," and unreasonably

high in its age limit of 21. As to the latter provision, the court said:
Under it, a twenty year old, married service man would be prevented from seeing
a film that might not be suitable for a girl of twelve. As Justice Frankfurter
remarked in a similar situation, "Surely, this is to burn the house to roast the pig."
172 F. Supp. at 72.

Similarly, some states have declared their crime comic book legislation to be
unconstitutional. Katzev v. Los Angeles, 52 Cal. 2d 360, 341 P.2d 310 (1959) (Los
Angeles county ordinance prohibiting the sale or distribution of any crime comic book
to any child under the age of 18 years) ; Police Comm'r v. Siegel Enterprises, 223

Md. 110, 162 A.2d 727, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 909 (1960) (Crime Comic Books Act
of Maryland) ; Adams v. Hinkle, 51 Wash. 2d 763, 322 P.2d 844 (1958) (comic book
licensing act).

266. Interstate Cir., Inc. v. Dallas, 247 F. Supp. 906 (N.D. Tex. 1965), aff'd, 366
F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1966), vacated and remanded. 391 U.S. 53 (1968).
267. 380 U.S. 51 (1965), rev'g 233 Md. 498, 197 A.2d 232 (1964).
268. 247 F. Supp. at 910 (citations omitted).
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Acting on this judicial encouragement, Dallas passed a new movie
censorship ordinance which Judge Hughes promptly sustained. She
ruled that the provision, in conjunction with Texas procedure, was
"sufficient to insure the exhibitor's right to a speedy determination
of the issue and to guarantee due process of law." 2" 9 The Fifth Circuit
affirmed; but the Supreme Court, in a per curiam decision, vacated
and remanded for the Fifth Circuit's further consideration in the light
270
of the Interstate Circuit decision.
If the Court takes the course of sustaining legislation which, as
construed, is limited to the protection of privacy or of youth, or both,
but of holding that consenting adults have a due process right to read,
see, hear or obtain pornography, there are still two cases that stand
in the way: United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs,27 ' where
the Court held that an individual could not import pornography for
use in a book for commercial distribution; and United States v.
Reidel,272 where the Court held that an adult did not have the right
to use the mail to send pornography to other adults who wanted it.
The first of these two cases can be confined to its facts. As for the
second, perhaps Justice Marshall's concurring opinion suggests a way
out:
While the record does not reveal that any children actually
received appellee's materials, I believe that distributors of purportedly obscene merchandise may be required to take more
stringent steps to guard against possible receipt by minors. 278
CONCLUSION

The courts should get out of the obscenity mess by holding that
consenting adults have a due process right to read, see, hear or obtain
whatever they like under the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Obscenity legislation should be restricted in the
manner that the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography recommended: to "regulations upon the sale of sexual materials to young
persons who do not have the consent of their parents;" and "to protect persons from having sexual materials thrust upon them without
2 74
their consent through the mails or through open public display.1
269. Interstate Cir., Inc. v. Dallas, 249 F. Supp. 19, 25 (N.D. Tex. 1965), aff'd,

366 F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1966), vacated and remanded, 391 U.S. 53 (1968).
270. Interstate Cir., Inc. v. Dallas, 391 U.S. 53 (1968).
271. 402 U.S. 363 (1971), rev'g 309 F. Supp. 36 (CD. Cal. 1970).
272. 402 U.S. 351 (1971).
273. Id. at 361-62.
274. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION

ON

OBSCENITY

AND PORNOGRAPHY
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OBSCENITY CASES ON THE COURT'S

Item

1970-1971

DOCKET

Date of Court's
Ruling or Filing

Docket
No.

1. Dallas Notes, a

41

Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200
(1971), vacating and remanding to 300 F. Supp. 602 (N.D.
Tex. 1969).

Feb. 23, 1971

2. Books and magazines.

55

Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410
(1971), aff'g 305 F. Supp. 634
(C.D. Cal. 1969).

Jan. 14, 1971

3. Models of France,

58

United States v. Book Bin, 400
U.S. 410 (1971), aff'g 306 F.
Supp. 1023 (N.D. Ga. 1969).

Jan. 14, 1971

4. Magazines, books
and playing
cards.

60

Feb. 23, 1971

5. I Am Curious
(Yellow), a
film.

63

6. 1 Am Curious
(Yellow), a
film.

83

7. Photographs depicting fellatio.

104

8. The Fox, a film.

116

Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82
(1971), rev'g in part, vacating and remanding in part to
Delta Book Distribs., Inc. v.
Cronvich, 304 F. Supp. 662
(E.D. La. 1969).
Grove Press v. State Bd. of
Censors, 401 U.S. 480 (1971),
aff'g by an evenly divided
Court 255 Md. 297, 258 A.2d
240 (1969) (Douglas, J., not
participating).
Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216
(1971), vacating and remanding to 306 F. Supp. 1363 (D.
Mass. 1969).
Wild v. United States, 402 U.S.
986 (1971), denying cert. to
422 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1969).
McGrew v. City of Jackson, 401
U.S. 987 (1971), vacating and
remanding to 307 F. Supp. 754
(S.D. Miss. 1969), "for reconsideration in light of Younger
v. Harris, . . . Samuels v.
Mackell, and Fernandez v.
Mackell ....
"*

9. Photographs for

133

134

United States v. Thirty-Seven
Photographs, 402 U.S. 363
(1971), rev'g 309 F. Supp. 36
(D.C. Cal. 1970).
Hosey v. City of Jackson, 401
U.S. 987 (1971), vacating and
remanding to 309 F. Supp. 527
(S.D. Miss. 1970), "for reconsideration in light of Younger
v. Harris, . . . Samuels v.
Mackell, and Fernandez v.
Mackell ....
"*

May 3, 1971

use in a book
describing sexual positions.
10. Candy, a film.

Radich v. New York, 401 U.S.
531 (1971), aff'g by an evenly
divided Court 26 N.Y.2d 114,
257 N.E.2d 30, 308 N.Y.S.2d
846 (1970) (Douglas, J., not
participating).

Mar. 23, 1971

bi-weekly
newspaper.

a magazine.

11. Sculptor Marc
Morrell's representation of
the American
flag as a phallus.

169

Mar. 8, 1971

Feb. 23, 1971

May 17, 1971

Mar. 29, 1971

Mar. 29, 1971

* See p. 394 supra.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol17/iss3/1

50

Rogge: The Obscenity Terms of the Court

FEBRUARY

1972]

OBSCENITY

TERMS

APPENDIX I Docket
No.

318

State Cinema, Inc. v. Ryan, 400

Oct. 12, 1970

360

F.2d 1400 (1st Cir. 1970),
aff'g 303 F. Supp. 579 (D.
Mass. 1969).
Grove Press, Inc. v. Flask, ap-

13. Peace demonstrator with
words "fuck the
draft" printed
on his jacket.
14. Vixen, a film.

299

17. Hair, a rock
musical which
in one scene
showed mass
fullfront nudity
of four or five
young men and
several girls.
18. Moving pictures.

Date of Court's
Ruling or Filing

Mar. 29, 1971

217

film.
16. Motion pictures.

Case

Johnnie Reb's Book & Card
Shop v. Slaton, 401 U.S. 985
(1971), aff'g N.D. Ga. (unreported), based on Samuel v.
Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971) ;
Fernandez v. Mackell, 401
U.S. 66 (1971) ; and Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
For a similar case, see Peachtree News Co. v. Slaton, 226
Ga. 471, 175 S.E.2d 539
(1970).
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971), rev'g 1 Cal. App. 3d
94, 81 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1969).

12. Books.

15. I Am Curious
(Yellow), a

(Continued)

364

484

June 7, 1971

U.S. 850, denying cert. to 422

peal docketed to review 326 F.

Supp. 574 (N.D. Ohio 1970).
United States v. 12 Reels, 403
U.S. 930 (1971), noting prob.
juris. to review C.D. Cal.
(Apr. 27, 1970) (unreported).
Byrne v. P.B.I.C., Inc., 401 U.S.

July 7, 1970
39 U.S.L.W. 3108
June 21, 1971

Mar. 29, 1971

987 (1971), vacating and remanding to 313 F. Supp. 757

(D. Mass. 1970), "to consider
question of mootness."

500

Ferdon v. Demich, 401 U.S. 990

Mar. 29, 1971

(1971), vacating and remand-

ing to 426 F.2d 643 (9th
Cir. 1970), "for consideration
in light of Perez v. Ledestna .... "

19. Stag movie of
a woman who
disrobed and
feigned some
sort of sexual
satisfaction
from selfinduced acts.

508

534
20. The True Facts
About Imported
Pornography,

California v. Pinkus, 400 U.S.

Nov. 23, 1970

922, aff'g by an evenly divided

Court 429 F.2d 416 (9th Cir.
1970) (Douglas, J.,not participating).

United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S.
351 (1971), rev'g C.D. Cal.
(unreported).

May 3, 1971

an illustrated
booklet.
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22. Abbie Hoffman,
the Yippie
leader, appeared in public
with word
"Fuck" written in red
letters on his
forehead.
23. I Am Curious
(Yellow), a
film.

568

24. Magazines emphasizing female genitalia.
25. Books and
magazines.

601

583

706

26. Magazines.

707

27. Disrobing by
eight young
women as a
protest against
Playboy magazine's use of
nude females
for commercial purposes.

722

28. Pterodactyl,a
newspaper.

766

29. Books and
magazines.

778

30. Lesbian Roommate, a
paperback.

786

(Continued)
Date of Court's

Docket
No.
21. Nudes displaying the genitalia in clinical detail.

[VOL. 17: p. 393

Case

Close v. Lederle, 400 U.S. 903,
denying cert. to 424 F.2d 988
(1st Cir. 1970), rev'g 303 F.
Supp. 1109 (D. Mass. 1969).
Hoffman v. Illinois, 400 U.S.
904, denying cert. to 45 Ill. 2d
221, 258 N.E.2d 326 (1970).

Faircloth v. M & W Theatres,
petition for cert. filed to review N.D. Fla. (1970) (unreported).
Keriakos v. Hunt, 400 U.S.
929, denying cert. to 428 F.2d
606 (1st Cir. 1970).
United States v. Various Articles of "Obscene" Merchandise, 402 U.S. 971 (1971),
noting prob. juris, to review
315 F. Supp. 191 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), appeal dismissed under
FED. R. Civ. P. 60, 403 U.S.
942 (1971).
United States v. 119 Cartons,
402 U.S. 969 (1971), vacating
and remanding to 324 F. Supp.
1112 (C.D. Cal. 1970), "for
reconsideration in light of...
United States v. Thirty-Seven
Photographs ....
Nelson v. Iowa, 401 U.S. 923
(1971), denying cert. to 178
N.W.2d 434 (Iowa 1970).

Turner v. Wilheim, 401 U.S. 947
(1971), denying cert. to 431
F.2d 177 (8th Cir. 1970).
Various Articles of "Obscene"
Merchandise v. United States,
400 U.S. 935 (1970), dismissing appeal from 315 F. Supp.
191 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
Childs v. Oregon, 401 U.S. 1006
(1971), rev'g 431 F.2d 272
(9th Cir. 1970), on the basis
of Redrup.
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Ruling or Filing

Nov. 9, 1970

Nov. 9, 1970

Aug. 24, 1970
39 U.S.L.W. 3084
Nov. 23, 1970
May 17, 1971

June 23, 1971
May 17, 1971

Feb. 22, 1971

Mar. 1, 1971
Dec. 7, 1970

Apr. 5, 1971
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31.

Docket
No.

The Libertine,
a film.

826

32. The Bushwackers, a film.

844

33. I Am Curious
(Yellow), a
film.

847

34. Motion pictures.

866

35. Motion pictures.

898

36. Books.

876

37. Vixen, a film.

942

38. Vixen, a film.

979

39. Nude dancers
in a bar.

1002

40. Language of
Love, a Swedish made sex
education film
which contains
explicit scenes
of sexual intercourse.
41. The Name is
Bonnie, a
pictorial.
42. Books and magazines.

1009

43. A Woman's
Urge, a film.

.1014

1018

1150

TERMS

(Continued)

Case

Date of Court's
Ruling or Filing

Thompson v. United Artists
Theatre Cir., Inc., appeal
docketed to review 316 F.
Supp. 815 (W.D. Ark. 1970).
ABC Books, Inc. v. Benson, 401
U.S. 988 (1971), vacating and
remanding to 315 F. Supp.
695 (M.D. Tenn. 1970), "for
reconsideration in light of
Younger v. Harris, . .
Samuels v. Mackell, and Fernandez v. Mackell..
... *
Grove Press, Inc. v. Bailey, appeal docketed to review 318 F.
Supp. 244 (N.D. Ala. 1970).
Spivak v. Shriver, appeal docketed to review 315 F. Supp.
695 (M.D. Tenn. 1970).
United Artists Theatre Cir., Inc.
v. Thompson, appeal docketed
to review 316 F. Supp. 815
(W.D. Ark. 1970).
Mitchum v. Foster, 402 U.S. 941,
noting prob. ]uris. to review
315 F. Supp. 1387 (N.D. Fla.
1970).
Austin v. Meyer, appeal docketed to review 319 F. Supp.
457 (M.D. Fla. 1970).
Meyer v. Austin, appeal docketed to review 319 F. Supp.
457 (M.D. Fla. 1970).
Barnard v. California, 401 U.S.
901 (1971), dismissing appeal
from Cal. Super. Ct. App.
(unreported).
United States v. Unicorn Enterprises, Inc., 401 U.S. 907
(1971), granting cert. to 432
F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
dismissed under FED. R. Crv.
P. 60, 403 U.S. 925 (1971).

Oct. 7, 1970
39 U.S.L.W. 3168

Miller v. United States, petition
for cert. filed to review 431
F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1970).
Norman v. United States, 402
U.S. 987 (1971), denying cert.
to 429 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir.
1970).

Nov. 27, 1970
39 U.S.L.W. 3247

Bloss v. Michigan, 402 U.S. 938
(1971), rev'g 27 Mich. App.
687, 184 N.W.2d 299 (1970),
on the basis of Redrup.

Mar, 29, 1971

Oct. 13, 1970
39 U.S.L.W. 3169
Oct. 17, 1970
39 U.S.L.W. 3181
Oct. 29, 1970
39 U.S.L.W. 3189
May 3, 1971

Nov. 5, 1970
39 U.S.L.W. 321$
Nov. 17, 1970
39 U.S.L.W. 3239
Feb. 22, 1971

Feb. 22, 1971

June 15, 1971

May 17, 1971

May 3, 1971

* See p. 394 supra.
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Case

Date of Court's
Ruling or Filing

44. Injunction
1215
against criminal prosecution.
45. Motion pictures.
1229

Book Mart, Inc. v. Mitchell, 401
U.S. 968 (1971), aff'g 318 F.
Supp. 352 (M.D. Fla. 1970).

Mar. 22, 1971

Shipyard Drive-In Theatre, Inc.
v. Scuncio, 401 U.S. 1005
(1971), denying review to 268
A.2d 820 (R.I. 1970).

Apr. 5, 1971

46. Books and
magazines.

1276

United States v. Orito, appeal
docketed to review E.D. Wis.
(Oct. 28, 1970) (unreported).

Jan. 26, 1971
39 U.S.L.W. 3333

47. Advertising brochures for
books and
magazines.
48. Magazines.

1288

Mar. 29, 1971

49. Books and
magazines.

1387

Miller v. California, 401 U.S.
992 (1971), noting prob. juris.
to review Cal. Super. Ct. App.
(1970) (unreported).
United States v. B & H Distrib.
Corp., 403 U.S. 927 (1971),
vacating and remanding to 319
F. Supp. 1231 (W.D. Wis.
1970), "for reconsideration in
light of . . . United States
v. Reidel . . . and United
States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs ....
Van Hoomissen v. Hayse, 403
U.S. 927 (1971), vacating and
remanding to D. Ore. (Nov.
19, 1970) (unreported), "for
reconsideration in light of...
Younger v. Harris, . . . Samnels v. Mackell, and Fernan*
dez v. Mackell....

50.

1424

51.

Whiplash
Lovers, a
magazine.

1383

June 21, 1971

June 21, 1971

Cornto v. Georgia, 402 U.S. 933
(1971), denying cert. to 227
Ga.46, 178 S.E.2d 894 (1970).
Scott v. Texas, 402 U.S. 1012
(1971), denying cert. to Tex.
Sup. Ct. (Nov. 11, 1970) (unreported).

Apr. 26, 1971
June 1, 1971

Motion picture.

1468

52. Injunctive relief against
prosecution.

1495

Col-An Entertainment Corp. v.
Harper, 402 U.S. 941, noting
prob. juris. to review 325 F.
Supp. 447 (N.D. Fla. 1971).

May 3, 1971

53. Man and Wife,
a film.

1541

Apr. 5, 1971
39 U.S.L.W. 3446

54. A motion picture.

1554

Wall v. California, appeal docketed to review Cal. Super. Ct.
App. (unreported).
Hicks v. Grove Press, Inc., petition for cert. filed to reviev
426 F.2d 643 (9th Cir. 1970).

55. "Girlie" magazines.

1573

Apr. 12, 1971
39 U.S.L.W. 3457

56. Motion pictures.

1599

Burgin v. South Carolina, petition for cert. filed to review
178 S.E.2d 325 (1970).
Pleasure House, Inc. v. Hicks,
appeal docketed to review
M.D. Cal. (Feb. 17, 1971)
(unreported).

Apr. 7, 1971
39 U.S.L.W. 3457

Apr. 19, 1971
39 U.S.L.W. 3474

* See p. 394 supra.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol17/iss3/1

54

Rogge: The Obscenity Terms of the Court

FEBRUARY

1972]

OBSCENITY

APPENDIX I Docket
No.

57. Motion pictures

58. Eros, a quart-

1654

erly, Liaison, a

Case

Strasbourg v. California, appeal
docketed to review Cal. Super.
Ct. App. (Jan. 26, 1971) (unreported).
Ginzburg v. United States, 403

Date of Court's
Ruling or Filing
Apr. 26, 1971
39 U.S.L.W. 3488

June 21, 1971

F.2d 1386 (3d Cir. 1971).

Housewife's
Handbook on
Selective Promiscuity, a

book by Mrs.
Lillian Maxine
Serett writing
under the pseudonym of
Rey Anthony.
59. Seed of the
1697
Beast, a book.

1790

azines.
61. Motion pictures.

(Continued)

U.S. 931, denying cert. to 436

newsletter, and

60. Books and mag-

TERMS

1898

Luros v. California, petition for
cert. filed to review 4 Cal. 3d
84, 480 P.2d 633, 92 Cal. Rptr.
833 (1971).
Goulet v. California, petition for
cert. filed to review Cal. Ct.
App. (unreported).
Dillon v. United States, petition
for cert. filed to review 4th
Cir. (Dec. 22, 1970) (unreported).

May 11, 1971
39 U.S.L.W. 3521

June 7, 1971
39 U.S.L.W. 3550
June 25, 1971
40 U.S.L.W. 3002

In Keriakos v. Hunt, 400 U.S. 929, denying cert. to 428 F.2d 606 (1st Cir. 1970),
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Harlan and Blackmun, "for the reasons expressed in
their separate opinions in Cain v. Kentucky, 397 U.S. 319 (1970), Walker v. Ohio.
,398 U.S. 434 (1970) (THE CHIEF JUSTICE) ; Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 496
(1957), Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 203 (1964), Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383
U.S. 413, 455 (1966) (MR. JUSTICE HARLAN) ; and Hoyt v. Minnesota, 399 U.S. 524
(1970) (MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN) would grant certiorari and reverse the judgment
below." Justice Douglas took no part in the decision.
The Second Circuit in United States v. A Motion Picture Film Entitled "I Am
-Curious (Yellow)," 404 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1968), by a two to one vote held the named
film (which was on the Court's 1970-1971 docket in no less than five cases) to be
-constitutionally protected.
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Date of Decision
1. Lust Pool and Shame
Agent, two paper
backs.
2. High Heels and Spree,
magazines.
3. Gent, Swank, Bachelor,
Modern Man, Cavalcade, Gentleman, Ace
and Sir, magazines.
4. Lust School, Lust Web
and Sin Servant,
books.
5. Bondage Boarding
School, English
Spanking School,
Bound and Spanked,
Sweeter Gwen,
Travelling Salesday
Gets Spanked and
Bound to Please,
books.
6. Honey Bee, a motion
picture which shows
a young woman disrobing until she is
wholly nude.
7. Six short girlie motion
picture films produced for showing at
private parties.
8. Promenade Bondage,
Spanking Nurses,
Spanking Sisters and
Bondage, books.
9. Packets of girlie photographs, as well as
bondage paperbacks.
10. Sex Life of a Cop, a
paperback.
11. Lust Job, a paperback.

12. Sin Hooked, Bayou
Sinners, Lust Hungry, Shame Shop,
Fleshpot, Sinners
Seance, Passion
Priestess, Penthouse
Pagans, Shame Market, Sin Warden and
Flesh Avenger, books.

Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S.
767 (1967) (per curiam).

May 8, 1967

Austin v. Kentucky, 386 U.S.
767 (1967) (per curiam).
Gent v. Arkansas, 386 U.S. 767
(1967), rev'g per curiam 239
Ark. 474, 393 S.W.2d 219
(1965).
Keney v. New York, 388 U.S.
(per curiam)
440 (1967)
(granting certiorari and reversing County Court of Monroe County, N.Y.).
Friedman v. New York, 388
U.S. 441 (1967) (per curiam).

May 8, 1967

Ratner v. California, 388 U.S.
442 (1967)
(per curiam)
(granting certiorari and reversing Appellate Department
of Supreme Court of California, County of San Mateo).

June 12, 1967

Cobert v. New York, 388 U.S.
443 (1967), rev'g per curiam
15 N.Y.2d 1020, 207 N.E.2d
619, 260 N.Y.S.2d 27 (1965).
Sheperd v. New York, 288 U.S.
444 (1967) (per curiam).

June 12, 1967

Avansino v. New York, 388 U.S.
446 (1967) (per curiam).

June 12, 1967

Aday v. United States, 388 U.S.
447 (1967), rev'g per curiam
357 F.2d 855 (6th Cir. 1966).
Books, Inc. v. United States, 388
U.S. 449 (1967), rev'g per
curiam 358 F.2d 935 (1st Cir.
1966).

June 12, 1967

Quantity of Copies of Books v.
Kansas, 388 U.S. 452 (1967),
rev'g per curiam 197 Kan. 306,
416 P.2d 703 (1966).

June 12, 1967
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(Continued)
Case

Date of Decision

13. Orgy Club, a book.

June 12, 1967

14.

June 12, 1967

15.

16.

17.

18.
19.

Mazes v. Ohio, 388 U.S. 453
(1967), rev'g per curiam 7
Ohio St. 2d 136, 218 N.E.2d
725 (1966).
Peep show motion picSchackman v. California, 388
ture films.
U.S. 454 (1967) (per curiam).
Potomac News Co. v. United
56 cartons containing
19,500 copies of a
States, 389 U.S. 47 (1967),
magazine entitled
rev'g per curiam 373 F.2d 635
Hellenic Sun.
(4th Cir.), aff'g 253 F. Supp.
498 (D. Md. 1966).
Escapade, Dude, Rogue, Connor v. City of Hammond,
H.Q., Cavalier and
389 U.S. 48 (1967) (per
Knight, magazines.
curiam).
Exclusive, Revue InterCentral Magazine Sales, Ltd. v.
national and InternaUnited States, 389 U.S. 50,
tional Nudist Sun,
rev'g per curiam 373 F.2d 633
(4th Cir. 1967), aff'g 253 F.
magazines.
Supp. 485 (D. Md. 1966).
Photographs of semiChance v. California, 389 U.S.
nude women.
89 (1967) (per curiam).
Motion picture film
I.M. Amusement Corp. v. Ohio,
389 U.S. 573 (1968), rev'g per
which in the words of
curiam 10 Ohio App. 2d 153,
the trial court showed
"two women, at least
226 N.E.2d 567 (1966).

nude to the waist, going through actions
that could lead to no
conclusion in my opinion except that they
were behaving like
lesbians."
20. Mondo Freudo, a motion picture film and
Olga's Girls, an advertising trailer.
21.. Nudist magazine.

22. Gent, Sir and Ace,
magazines.

23. Candid and Hefty,
magazines.

24. 1, A Woman, a film.

25. Booklets and magazines.

Management
Robert-Arthur
Corp. v. Tennessee, 389 U.S.
578 (1968), rev'g per curiant
414 S.W.2d 638 (Tenn. 1967).
Felton v. Pensacola, 390 U.S.
340 (1968), rev'g per curiain
200 So. 2d 842 (Fla. Ct. App.
1967).
Henry v. Louisiana, 392 U.S.
655 (1968), rev'g per curiain
250 La. 682, 198 So. 2d 889
(1967).
Carlos v. New York, 396 U.S.
119, rev'g per curiarn 24 App.
Div. 2d 865, 248 N.E.2d 924,
301 N.Y.S.2d 96 (1969).
Cain v. Kentucky, 397 U.S. 319
(1970), rev'g per curiam 437
S.W.2d 769 (Ky. Ct. App.
1969).
Bloss v. Dykema, 398 U.S. 278
(1970), rev'g per curiain 17
Mich. App. 318, 169 N.W.2d
367 (1969).

Oct. 23, 1967

Oct. 29, 1967
Oct. 23, 1967

Nov. 6, 1967
Jan. 15, 1968

Jan. 15, 1968

Mar. 11, 1968

June 17, 1968

Dec. 8, 1969

Mar. 23, 1970

June 1, 1970
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26. Lurid Sinner, Sin Crop,
Nifties Vol. 195 and
Peek-a-Boo No. 4,
books.
27. The Way of a Man
with a Maid, Adam
and Eve, Business as
Usual, Lady Susan's
Cruel Lover and True
Love Stories of
Growing Up, books.
28. Lesbian Roommate, a
paperback.
29. A Woman's Urge, a
film.
30. "Girlie" Magazines.
31. Night of Lust, a film.
32. No item mentioned.

[VOL.

17: p. 393

(Continued)
Case

Date of Decision

Walker v. Ohio, 398 U.S. 434
(1970) (per curiam).

June 15, 1970

Hoyt v. Minnesota, 399 U.S. 524,
rev'g per curiam 386 Minn.
92, 174 N.W2d 700 (1970).

June 29, 1970

Childs v. Oregon, 401 U.S. 1006
(1971), rev'g 431 F.2d 272
(9th Cir. 1970).
Bloss v. Michigan, 402 U.S. 938
(1971), rev'g 18 Mich. App.
410, 171 N.W.2d 455 (1969).
Burgin v. South Carolina, 92 S.
Ct. 46 (1971).
Hartstein v. Missouri, 40 U.S.L.W. 3278.
Wiener v. California, 40 U.S.L.W. 3278.

Apr. 5, 1971
May 3, 1971
Oct. 12, 1971
Dec. 14, 1971
Dec. 14, 1971

There the two different obscenity cases entitled Ratner v. California, one of which
appears in Appendix 1I, the other in Appendix IV. Similarly, there are two different
cases entitled Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas. One appears in Appendix II,
the other is reported at 378 U.S. 205 (1964), rev'g 191 Kan. 13, 379 P.2d 254 (1963).
Also note that there are two different obscenity cases entitled Childs v. Oregon, the
first of which appears in Appendix II and the second in Appendix IV.
As is their wont in such cases, the justices, even in the Court's per curiam rulings,
went every which way. Justice Harlan, who has accepted Justice Stewart's view that
the obscenity exception to the first amendment is confined to hard core pornography,
nevertheless would have given the states somewhat more leeway in obscenity contests
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment than he would have given the
federal government under the first amendment. For example, in Interstate Circuit, Inc.
v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968), one of the three obscenity cases in which the Court
heard argument during its 1967-68 term, Justice Harlan stated in his concurring
opinion:
Reiterating the viewpoint that I have expressed in earlier opinions, I would limit
federal control of obscene materials to those which all would recognize as what
has been called "hard core pornography," and would withhold the federal judicial
hand from interfering with state determinations except in instances where the state
action clearly appears to be but the product of prudish overzealousness.
Id. at 708. Because of this view, Justice Harlan dissented in 25 of the 29 cases - all
but the four federal proceedings: Central Magazine Sales, Ltd. v. United States, 389
U.S. 50 (1967); Potomac News Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 47 (1967) ; Books,
Inc. v. United States, 388 U.S. 449 (1967); and Aday v. United States, 388 U.S.
447 (1967). In nearly all of the state cases, after Redrup, Gent and Austin, and in
two of the four federal cases, Justice Harlan based his dissents, as well as his concurrences, on his separate opinion in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 496 (1957),
and his dissenting opinion in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 455 (1966).
In Walker v. Ohio, 398 U.S. 434, 435 (1970), and Bloss v. Dykema, 398 U.S. 278
(1970), he added his dissenting opinion in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 203 (1964).
In Hoyt v. Minnesota, 399 U.S. 524, 525 (1970), he and Chief Justice Burger joined
in the dissenting opinion of Justice Blackmun, which cited Justice Harlan's opinions
in these three cases. In Mazes v. Ohio, 388 U.S. 453 (1967), Justice Harlan, along
with Chief Justice Warren and Justice Clark, voted for setting the case for oral
argument on the Ohio statute. In two of the four federal cases, Aday v. United
States, 388 U.S. 447 (1967), and Books, Inc. v. United States, 388 U.S. 449 (1967),
he based his concurrences on Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), and Manual
Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
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Justice Clark joined in Justice Harlan's dissents in Redrup, Gent, and Austin, and
agreed with Justice Harlan's decisions in seven more state cases, albeit for different
reasons. Schackman v. California, 388 U.S. 454 (1967) ; Quantity of Copies of Books
v. Kansas, 388 U.S. 452 (1967) ; Corinth Publications, Inc. v. Wesberry, 388 U.S. 448
(1967); Avinsino v. New York, 388 U.S. 446 (1967); Sheperd v. New York, 388
U.S. 444 (1967) ; Cobert v. New York, 388 U.S. 443 (1967) ; Ratner v. California,
388 U.S. 442 (1967). In two of the seven, Ratner and Cobert, Chief Justice Warren
and Justice Brennan voted with Justice Clark. In two more of the seven, Sheperd
and Avinsino, Chief Justice Warren voted with Justice Clark for affirmance, based
on Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966). In Schackman, the fifth of the seven,
Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan voted with him on the basis of Ginzburg v.
United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966). Chief Justice Warren voted to set Corinth
Publications and Quantity of Books, the remaining two of the seven cases, for oral
argument, relying in the latter case on Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378
U.S. 205 (1964), rev'g 191 Kan. 13, 379 P.2d 254 (1963). In all seven of the cases,
Justice Harlan agreed with Justice Clark's disposition of the cases, but steadfastly
relied on his separate opinions in Roth and Fanny Hill. In all of the nine remaining
state cases decided while he was on the bench, Justice Clark voted for reversal, while
Justice Harlan voted for affirmance.
In two of the four federal cases, Justice Clark voted for affirmance; Justice Harlan
for reversal. Books, Inc. v. United States, 388 U.S. 449 (1967) ; and Aday v. United
States, 388 U.S. 447 (1967). In Books, Chief Justice Warren wanted to set the case
for oral argument, and in Aday he voted with Justice Brennan to vacate the judgment
and remand the case in light of Fanny Hill. In the other two, Potomac News Co. v.
United States, 389 U.S. 47 (1967), and Central Magazine Sales, Ltd. v. United States,
389 U.S. 50 (1967), Justices Clark and Harlan both voted for reversal. Chief Justice
Warren voted for affirmance in both cases, relying on Roth to reach his conclusion
in Central Magazine.
In one of the state cases in which Justice Harlan voted for affirmance, Chief
Justice Warren separately so voted. Robert-Arthur Management Corp. v. Tennessee,
389 U.S. 578 (1968). In another, he concurred in reversal on the ground that evidence
of contemporary community standards was excluded at the trial. I.M. Amusement
Corp. v. Ohio, 389 U.S. 573 (1968). In a third, he voted for reversal on the basis of
Roth. Felton v. City of Pensacola, 390 U.S. 340 (1968). In a fourth, he wanted to set
the case for oral argument. Corinth Publications, Inc. v. Wesberry, 388 U.S. 448
(1967). In a fifth, he and Justices Brennan and Clark wanted to affirm on the basis
of Ginzburg v. United States. Schackman v. California, 388 U.S. 454 (1967).
In four of the five state cases decided at the 1969-70 term, Chief Justice Burger
dissented along with Justice Harlan, joining in Justice Blackmun's dissent in Hoyt.
Hoyt v. Minnesota, 399 U.S. 524, 525 (1970); Walker v. Ohio, 398 U.S. 434, 435
(1970) ; Cain v. Kentucky, 397 U.S. 319, 320 (1970) ; Carlos v. New York, 396 U.S.
119 (1968). In the fifth case, Chief Justice Burger and Justice White were of the
opinion that certiorari should be denied. Bloss v. Dykema, 398 U.S. 278 (1970).
It was in one of the four federal cases, that there was as wide a divergence of
views between trial and reviewing courts as has probably ever occurred: a federal
district judge imposed sentences aggregating 40 years in prison, and fines aggregating
$69,000; the federal Supreme Court, without briefs and without argument, reversed
per curiam. Aday v. United States, 388 U.S. 447 (1967). The Justices themselves
voted four different ways. Five Justices - Black, Douglas, Stewart, White and
Fortas - joined in the per curiam reversal, citing Redrup. Justice Harlan concurred
in the reversal on the basis of the reasoning in his opinions in Roth and Manual

Enterprises, Inc. v. Day. Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan voted to vacate
the judgment and remand in the light of Fanny Hill. Justice Clark voted to affirm.
In Childs v. Oregon, 401 U.S. 1006 (1971), Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Blackmun and Harlan were of the opinion that certiorari should be denied. In Bloss
v. Michigan, 402 U.S. 938 (1971), they would have "set [the] case for oral argument
on [the] issue [of] whether [the] seizure of the film without a warrant violated
applicable constitutional standards."
Although the Burger Court has continued to make Redrup reversals, as evidenced
by two recent rulings, Justice White dissented along with Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Blackmun. Hartstein v. Missouri, 40 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Dec. 14, 1971);
and Wiener v. California, 40 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Dec. 14, 1971). If the two new
Justices, Powell and Rehnquist, share their view, perhaps the Court will adopt Justice
Harlan's course and give to the states power over obscenity, limited only by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, in contrast to the power of the federal
government, which is severely limited by the sweeping prohibition of the first
amendment.
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APPENDIX III
OTHER RULINGS COMPARABLE

To

REDRUP

Date of Decision
1. Sin Whisper, a book.

2. Solis, a nudist magazine.
3. Rent-A-Girl and Body
of a Female, motion
pictures.

4. International Nudist
Sun, a magazine.
5. Motion pictures.

6. Three reels of eightmillimeter film depicting men and women
engaged in acts of
sexual intercourse
and sodomy.
7. Topless dancing.

8. Spankers Monthly and
Flair magazines;
Buttock Fetishism,
Whip and Lash,
Bound and Transformed, The Autobiography of a Flea,
It's Delightful, The
120 Days of Sodom,
Lady Susan's Cruel
Lover, Skirted Man,
Teenage Discipline,
Hermaphroditein
Silks, and Dominant
Female, books.
9. Angelique in Black
Leather, a film.

Corinth Publications, Inc. v.
Wesberry, 388 U.S. 448
(1967), rev'g per curiam 221
Ga. 704, 146 S.E.2d 764
(1966).
Rosenbloom v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 450 (1967) (per curiam).
Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusack, 390
U.S. 139 (1968), rev'g per
curiam 38 Ill. 2d 53, 230
N.E.2d 241 (1967) (Chicago
motion picture censorship ordinance held unconstitutional).
California v. Noroff, 390 U.S.
1012 (1968), denying cert. to
433 P.2d 479, 63 Cal. Rptr. 575
(1967).
Lee Art Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia, 392 U.S. 636 (1968)
(per curiam) (obscenity conviction involving motion pictures reversed because of unconstitutional seizure).
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557
(1969), rev'g 224 Ga. 259, 161
S.E.2d 309 (1968).

June 12, 1967

California v. Giannini, 395 U.S.
910 (1969), denying cert. to
69 Cal. 2d 563, 446 P.2d 535,
72 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1968).
Von Cleef v. New Jersey, 395
U.S. 814 (1969), rev'g per
curiam and remanding to 102
N.J. Super. 102, 245 A.2d 495,
review denied, 52 N.J. 399, 246
A.2d 456 (1968).

May 19, 1969

Wilkinson v. Tyrone, Inc., 396
U.S. 985, denying cert. to 410
F.2d 639 (4th Cir.), aff'g 294
F. Supp. 1330 (E.D. Va. 1969)
(adversary hearing required
on the issue of obscenity before seizure).

Dec. 15, 1969
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10. Odd Triangle, a film.

11. Motion pictures.

12. An allegedly "obscene"
motion picture and
advertisements.

13. Stag movie of a woman
who disrobed and
feigned some sort of
sexual satisfaction
from self-induced acts.
14. Wonder Girl, Cover
Girl, Suzette and exciting magazines emphasizing female
genitalia.
15. Material determined by
the Postmaster General to be obscene and
unmailable.

16. Models of France, a
magazine determined
by the Postmaster
General to be obscene
and unmailable.

17. Pterodactyl, a newspaper.

18. Peace demonstrator
with words "fuck the
draft" printed on his
jacket.

TERMS

(Continued)
Case

Date of Decision

Cahn v. Bethview Amusement
Corp., 397 U.S. 920 (1970),
denying cert. to 416 F.2d 410
(2d Cir. 1969) (adversary
hearing required on the issue
of obscenity before seizure).
Vergari v. 208 Cinema, Inc., 397
U.S. 934 (1970), denying cert.
(adversary hearing required
before seizure).
Dial v. Fontaine, 399 U.S. 521
(1970), dismissing appeal from

Feb. 24, 1970

Feb. 27, 1970

June 29, 1970

303 F. Supp. 436 (W.D. Tex.

1969) (adversary hearing required on the issue of obscenity before seizure), for
want of inns.
California v. Pinkus, 400 U.S.
922, aff'g by an evenly divided
Court 429 F.2d 416 (9th Cir.
1970) (Douglas, J., not participating).
Keriakos v. Hunt, 400 U.S. 929,
denying cert. to 488 F.2d 606
(1st Cir. 1970).
Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410
(1971), aff'g 305 F. Supp. 634
(C.D. Cal. 1969) (39 U.S.C.
§ 4006 (1964), now 39 U.S.C.
§ 3006 (1970), authorizing a
mail block, held unconstitutional).
United States v. Book Bin, 400
U.S. 410 (1971), affg 306 F.
Supp. 1023 (N.D. Ga. 1969)
(39 U.S.C. §§ 4006, 4007
(1964), now 39 U.S.C. §§
3006, 3007 (1970), held unconstitutional).
Turner v. Wilhelm, 401 U.S.
947 (1971), denying cert. to
431 F.2d 177 (8th Cir. 1970),
aff'g 298 F. Supp. 1335 (S.D.
Iowa 1969).
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971), rev'g 1 Cal. App. 3d
94, 81 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1969).

Nov. 23, 1970

Nov. 23, 1970

Jan. 14, 1971

Jan. 14, 1971

Mar. 1, 1971

June 17, 1971

In Gable v. Jenkins, 397 U.S. 592 (1970), aff'g 309 F. Supp. 998 (N.D. Ga. 1969),
the lower court, although sustaining the validity of a Georgia obscenity statute, ordered
the return of the seized material on the ground of an illegal seizure.
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ITEMS HELD OBSCENE AT RECENT TERMS

1. Eros, a quarterly; Liaison, a newsletter; and
Housewife's Handbook on Selective
Promiscuity, a book
by Mrs. Lillian Maxine Serett writing under the pseudonym of
Rey Anthony.
2. Fifty paperbacks, such
as Impact, Dance
With the Dominant
Whip, The Hours of
Torture, Fearful
Ordeal in Restraintland, Screaming Flesh,
Swish Bottom, Raw
Dames, and Stud
Broad.
3. Un Chant d'Amour, a
film directed by
Jean Genet.
4. Nudie type motion
pictures.
5. Grecian Guild Studio
Quarterly, a pamphlet of nude or
nearly nude males.
6. Six fiberglass life sized
statues of males and
females in erotic embrace which the
French-born sculptor
Marcel Fort, living in
Miami, was displaying for sale in his
backyard.
7. Topless go-go dancers
convicted of disorderly conduct.
8. Photographs of nude
and nearly nude male.

9. Bondage Cabin, a book,
and The Count, a film
depicting sadistic and
masochistic acts.
10. Just for Kicks, a book.

11. Lesbian Roommate, a
paperback.

Case

Date of Decision

Ginzburg v. United States, 383
U.S. 463 (1966), aff'g 338
F.2d 12 (3d Cir. 1964), aff'g
224 F. Supp. 129 (E.D. Pa.
1963).

Mar. 21, 1966

Ginzburg v. United States, 403
U.S. 931, denying cert. to 436
F.2d 1386 (3d Cir. 1971).
Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S.
502 (1966), aff'g 15 N.Y.2d
671, 204 N.E.2d 209, 255
N.Y.S.2d 881 (1964), aff'g 17
App. Div. 2d 243, 234
N.Y.S.2d 342 (1962), modifying and aff'g 26 Misc. 2d 152,
207 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Ct. Spec.

June 21, 1971
Mar. 21, 1966

Sess. 1960).

Landau v. Fording, 388 U.S. 456
(1967), aff'g 245 Cal. App. 2d
820, 54 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1966).
Wenzler v. Pitchess, 388 U.S.
912 (1967), denying cert. to
359 F.2d 402 (9th Cir. 1966).
G.I. Distribs., Inc. v. New York,
389 U.S. 905, denying cert. to
20 N.Y.2d 204, 228 N.E.2d
787, 281 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1967).
Fort v. Miami, 389 U.S. 918,
denying cert. to 195 So. 2d
53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).

June 12, 1967

Bennett v. California, 389 U.S.
985, denying cert. to Cal. Sup.
Ct. (Apr. 12, 1967) (unreported).
Levin v. Maryland, 389 U.S.
1048 (1968), denying cert. to
1 Md. App. 139, 228 A.2d 487
(1967).
Ratner v. California, 390 U.S.
924 (1968), denying cert. to
256 Cal. App. 2d 925, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 500 (1967).
Bray v. California, 390 U.S. 987
(1968), denying cert. to Cal.
Super. Ct. App. (unreported).
Childs v. Oregon, 394 U.S. 931
(1969), denying cert. to 252
Ore. 91, 447 P.2d 304 (1968).

Dec. 4, 1967
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12. Blood Orgy, His
Brother Love, Pay
the Devil, The
Fleshworshippers,
Never on Sin Day,
Gay Reunion, and
That Kind of Girl,
paperbacks.
13. Topless dancing.
14. Filmed acts of sexual
intercourse.
15. Magazines.

16. Striptease dancing.

17. Screw, The Sex
Review, a weekly
tabloid, and The New
York Review of Sex
& Politics, a biweekly tabloid.
18. A motion picture.

19. Books and magazines.

20. I Am Curious
(Yellow), a film.

21. Photographs depicting
fellatio.
22. Photographs for use in
a book describing
sexual positions.
23. Sculptor Marc Morrell's
representation of the
American flag as a
phallus.

TERMS

(Continued)
Case

Date of Decision

Daly v. California, 394 U.S. 929
(1969), denying cert. to Cal.
Super. Ct. App. (Aug. 3,
1968) (unreported).

Apr. 28, 1969

Derrington v. Portland, 396 U.S.
901, denying cert. to 253 Ore.
289, 451 P.2d 111 (1969).
Spillman v. United States, 396
U.S. 930, denying cert. to 413
F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1969).
Johnson v. Massachusetts, 396
U.S. 990, denying cert. to 355
Mass. 800, 247 N.E.2d 701
(1969).
Jones v. Birmingham, 396 U.S.
1011 (1970), denying cert. to
45 Ala. App. 86, 224 So. 2d
922 (1969).
New York Feed Co. v. Leary,
397 U.S. 98 (1970), aff'g 305
F. Supp. 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)
(injunctive relief denied).

Nov. 10, 1969

Wright v. Virginia, 397 U.S. 964
(1970), denying cert. to Va.
Sup. Ct. App. (Oct. 14, 1969)
(unreported).
Spicer v. New York, 397 U.S.
1042 (1970), denying cert. to
33 App. Div. 2d 652, 305
N.Y.S.2d 122 (1969).
Grove Press v. State Bd. of
Censors, 401 U.S. 480 (1971),
aff'g by an evenly divided
Court 255 Md. 297, 258 A.2d
240 (1969) (Douglas, J., not
participating).
Wild v. United States, 402 U.S.
986 (1971), denying cert. to
422 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1969).
United States v. Thirty-Seven
Photographs, 402 U.S. 363
(1971), rev'g 309 F. Supp. 36
(C.D. Cal. 1970).
Radich v. New York, 401 U.S.
521 (1971), affg by an evenly
divided Court 26 N.Y.2d 114,
257 N.E.2d 30, 308 N.Y.S.2d
846 (1970) (Douglas, J., not
participating).

Mar. 2, 1970

Nov. 17, 1969
Dec. 15, 1969

Jan. 12, 1970

Feb. 27, 1970

Apr. 20, 1970

Mar. 8, 1971

May 17, 1971
May 3, 1971

Mar. 23, 1971
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Date of Decision

24. Vixen, a film.

State Cinema, Inc. v. Ryan, 400
U.S. 850, denying cert. to 422
F.2d 1400 (1st Cir. 1970),
aff'g 303 F. Supp. 579 (D.
Mass. 1969) (injunctive relief
denied).

Oct. 12, 1970

25. The True Facts About
Imported Pornography, an illustrated
booklet.

United States v. Riedel, 402 U.S.
351 (1971), rev'g C.D. Cal.
(June 8, 1970) (unreported).

May 3, 1971

26. Nudes displaying the
genitalia in clinical
detail.

Close v. Lederle, 400 U.S. 903
denying cert. to 424 F.2d 988
(1st Cir. 1970), rev'g 303 F.
Supp. 1109 (D. Mass. 1969).

Nov. 9, 1970

27. Abbie Hoffman, the
Yippie leader, appeared in public with
word "Fuck" written
in red letters on his
forehead.

Hoffman v. Illinois, 400 U.S.
904, denying cert. to 45 111. 2d
221, 258 N.E.2d 326 (1970).

Nov. 9, 1970

28. Magazines.

United States v. 119 Cartons,
402 U.S. 969 (1971), vacating
and remanding to 324 F. Supp.
1112 (C.D. Cal. 1970), "for
reconsideration in light of
United States v. Thirty-Seven
Photographs .... "

May 17, 1971

29. Disrobing by eight
young women as a
protest against Playboy magazine's use of
nude females for commercial purposes.

Nelson v. Iowa, 401 U.S. 923
(1971), denying cert. to 178
N.W.2d 434 (Iowa 1970).

Feb. 12, 1971

30. Pterodactyl, a newspaper.

Turner v. Wilheim, 401 U.S. 947
(1971), denying cert. to 431
F.2d 177 (8th Cir. 1970).

Mar. 1, 1971

31. Nude dancers in a bar.

Barnard v. California, 401 U.S.
901 (1971), dismissing appeal
from Cal. Super. Ct. App.
(Aug. 20, 1970) (unreported).

Feb. 22, 1971

32. Matter sent through
the mails.

Norman v. United States, 402
U.S. 987 (1971), denying cert.
to 9th Cir. (Oct. 9, 1970)
(unreported).

May 17, 1971

33. Books.

New Orleans Book Mart, Inc.
Mitchell, 401 U.S. 968 (1971),
aff'g 318 F. Supp. 352 (M.D.
Fla. 1970).

Mar. 22, 1971

34. Withholding of motion
picture license on
grounds of obscenity.

Shipyard Drive-In Theatre, Inc.
v. Scunzio, 401 U.S. 1005
(1971), denying review to 268
A.2d 820 (R.I. 1970) (dismissed for want of jurisdiction).

Apr. 5, 1971
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35. Magazines transported
in interstate cornmerce by common
carrier.

TERMS

(Continued)
Case

Date of Decision

United States v. B & H Distrib.
Corp., 403 U.S. 927 (1971),
vacating and remanding to
319 F. Supp. 1231 (W.D.
Wis. 1970), "for reconsideration in light of United States

June 21, 1971

v. Reidel, . . . and United

36. Whiplash Lovers, a
magazine.
37. Motion pictures.

States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs .... "
Gornto v. Georgia, 402 U.S. 933
(1971), denying cert. to 227
Ga. 46, 178 S.E.2d 894 (1970).
Scott v. Texas. 402 U.S. 1012,
denying cert. to 460 S.W.2d
103 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1970).

Apr. 26, 1971
June 1, 1970

Anyone who tries to make rhyme or reason out of the Court's obscenity rulings
can begin with this comment by Justice Harlan in his dissent in Bloss v. Dykema,
398 U.S. 278 (1970): "I am at a loss to understand how these materials can
be deemed to qualify for Redrup treatment when only a short time ago the Court
declined to accord that treatment to the materials involved in Spicer. .. "
In most of the cases in this Appendix, Justice Douglas would have granted review.
In many of them he would have gone further and reversed. In the case of the film
Un Chant d'Amour, Justices Black, Stewart and Fortas voted with him for reversal.
In the case of sculptor Marcel Fort, Justices Douglas and Black joined in Justice
Stewart's dissenting opinion.
In four cases, Justice Douglas would have reversed on the basis of Redrup. Bray
v. California, 390 U.S. 987 (1968) ; Ratner v. California, 390 U.S. 924 (1968) ; G.I.
Distribs., Inc. v. New York, 389 U.S. 905 (1967) ; and Wenzler v. Pitchess, 388 U.S.
912 (1967). In the last case, Justices Black and Stewart joined him, and in two of the
others, Ratner and Bray, Justice Black alone joined. In addition, in two cases, where
the Court granted review in a per curiam ruling, thereafter reversing and remanding
the cases to the lower courts, Justices Black and Douglas joined in the decision for
reversal on the basis of Redrup. Lee Art Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia, 392 U.S. 636
(1968) ; Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusack, 390 U.S. 139 (1968). In one of the three
obscenity cases at which the Court heard argument at its 1967-1968 term, Justices
Douglas and Black indicated a willingness to reverse on the basis of Redrup. Ginsberg
v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). Thus, if one includes Redrup and the two cases
decided with it, Justice Douglas at recent terms would have used Redrup to reverse
a total of three dozen obscenity judgments; and Justice Black only one less. When
one adds to this startling fact the consideration that these two Justices have consistently taken the position that there was no obsceniy exception to the first amendment,
one realizes the extent to which Redrup became the password for reversing findings
of obscenity. Along with Redrup becoming the password for reversals in obscenity
contests, the concept of hard core pornography became the test for judging obscenity.
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APPENDIX V
OBSCENITY CASES ON THE COURT'S DOCKET, OCTOBER

Prior
Docket
No.
19
970-71
Term

Date of Court's
Rulings or
Filings

Docket
No.

1. I Am Curious
360
(Yellow), a film

70-1

2. Motion pictures.

70-2

364

1971

Grove Press, Inc. v. Flask, 40
U.S.L.W. 3005, docketing appeal to review 326 F. Supp.
574 (N.D. Ohio 1970).
United States v. 12 Reels, 403
U.S. 930 (1971), noting prob.
juris. to review C.D. Cal.
(Apr. 27, 1970) (unreported).
Faircloth v. M & W Theatres,
40 U.S.L.W. 3005, petition for
cert. filed to review N.D. Fla.
(May 27, 1970) (unreported).
Thompson v. United Artists
Theatre Cir., Inc. 40 U.S.L.W.
3005, docketing appeal to review 316 F. Supp. 815 (W.D.
Ark. 1970).
Grove Press, Inc. v. Bailey, 40
U.S.L.W. 3005, docketing appeal to review 318 F. Supp.
244 (N.D. Ala. 1970).
Spivak v. Shriver, 40 U.S.L.W.
3005, docketing appeal to review 315 F. Supp. 695 (M.D.
Tenn. 1970).
United Artists Theatre Cir., Inc.
v. Thompson, 40 U.S.L.W.
3005, docketing appeal to review 316 F. Supp. 815 (W.D.
Ark. 1970).
Mitchum v. Foster, 402 U.S. 941
(1971), noting prob. juris. to
review 315 F. Supp. 1387
(N.D. Fla. 1970) (argued
Dec. 13, 1971).

July 6, 1970

July 6, 1971

3. I Am Curious
583
(Yellow), a film.

70-10

4. The Libertine,
a film.

826

70-23

5. 1 Am Curious
847
(Yellow), a film.

70-24

6. Motion pictures.

866

70-25

7. Motion pictures.

898

70-30

8. Books.

876

70-27

9. Motion pictures.

942

70-35

Austin v. Meyer, 40 U.S.L.W.
3005, docketing appeal to review 319 F. Supp. 457 (M.D.
Fla. 1970).

Nov. 17, 1970

979

70-41

Nov. 17, 1970

11. Printed Matter.

1014

70-43

12. Various
materials.

1276

70-69

Meyer v. Austin, 40 U.S.L.W.
3006, docketing appeal to review 319 F. Supp. 457 (M.D.
Fla. 1970).
Miller v. United States, 40
U.S.L.W. 3006, petition for
cert. filed to review 431 F.2d
655 (9th Cir. 1970).
United States v. Orito, 40
U.S.L.W. 3006, docketing appeal to review E.D. Wis.
(Oct. 28, 1970) (unreported).

10. Motion pictures.
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Prior
Docket
No.
1970-71 Docket
Term
No.
13. Printed matter.

1288

70-73

14. Motion pictures.

1495

70-100

15. Man and wife,
a film.

1541

70-111

16. Motion pictures.

1554

70-114

17. "Girlie"

1573

70-122

18. Motion pictures.

1599

70-127

19. Motion pictures.

1630

70-133

20. Various materials.

1697

70-160

21. 69 Potion,
a book.

1825

70-280

22. Motion pictures.

1898

70-351

magazines.

TERMS

(Continued)

Date of Court's
Rulings or

Case

Filings

Miller v. California, 401 U.S.
992 (1971), noting prob. ]uris.
to review Cal. Super. Ct. App.
(Oct. 12, 1970) (unreported).
Col-An Entertainment Corp. v.
Harper, 402 U.S. 941 (1971),
noting prob. juris. to review
325 F. Supp. 447 (N.D. Fla.
1971), appeal dismissed under
FED. R. Civ. P. 60.
Wall v. California, 40 U.S.L.W.
3007, docketing appeal to review Cal. Super. Ct. App.
(Nov. 30, 1970) (unreported),
appeal dismissed for want of
federal question, 40 U.S.L.W.
3160.
Hicks v. Grove Press, Inc., 40
U.S.L.W. 3007, petition for
cert. filed to review 426 F.2d
643 (9th Cir. 1970), judgment
vacated and case remanded to
9th Cir., 40 U.S.L.W. 3160.
Burgin v. South Carolina, 40
U.S.L.W. 3007, petition for
cert, filed to review 255 S.C.
237, 178 S.E.2d 325 (1970),
rev'd, 40 U.S.L.W. 3160.
Pleasure House, Inc. v. Hicks,
40 U.S.L.W. 3007, docketing
appeal to review C.D. Cal.
(Feb. 17, 1971) (unreported),
dismissed for want of juris.,
40 U.S.L.W. 3159.
Strasbourg v. California, 40
U.S.L.W. 3007, docketing appeal to review Cal. Super. Ct.
App. (Jan. 26, 1971) (unreported), dismissed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3160.
Luros v. California, 40 U.S.L.W.
3007, petition for cert. filed
to review 4 Cal. 3d 84, 480
P.2d 633, 92 Cal. Rptr. 833
(1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3162.
Summerlin v. Ohio, 40 U.S.L.W.
3009, petition for cert. filed to
review Ohio Sup. Ct. (Mar.
3,1971) (unreported).
Dillon v. United States, 40 U.S.L.W. 3002, petition for cert.
filed to review 4th Cir. (Dec.
22, 1970) (unreported), cert.
denied, 40 U.S.L.W. U65.

Jan. 29, 1971

Mar. 19, 1971
Aug. 20, 1971
Apr. 5, 1971

Oct. 12, 1971
Apr. 7, 1971

Oct. 12, 1971
Apr. 12, 1971

Oct. 12, 1971
Apr. 19, 1971

Oct. 12, 1971
Apr. 26, 1971

Oct. 12, 1971
May 11, 1971

Oct. 12, 1971
June 5, 1971

June 25, 1971
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23. Nude entertainment in bars.

[VOL. 17: p. 393

(Continued)

Prior
Docket
No.
1970-71 Docket
Term
No.

Date of Court's
Rulings or
Filings

71-36

California v. La Rue, 40 U.S.-

July 6,

24. A motion picture.

71-40

Kaplan v. United States, 40
U.S.L.W. 3042, petition for
cert. filed to review D.C. Cir.
(May 10, 1971) (unreported).

July 7,

25. Various materials.

71-82

Luros v. California, 40 U.S.L.W.
3048, petition for cert. filed to
review 4 Cal. 3d 84, 480 P.2d
633, 92 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1971),
cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W.
3162.

July 15, 1971

26. 1 Am Curious
(Yellow), a film.

71-89

July 16, 1971

27. Use of the term
"sexual interest
of such deviant
groups" instead
of "prurient interest"
in jury instructions.
28. No item
mentioned.

71-182

Evans Theatre Corp. v. Slaton,
40 U.S.L.W. 3048, petition for
cert. filed to review 227 Ga. 377
(1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3220.
Ewing v. United States, 40 U.S.L.W. 3079, petition for cert.
filed to review 10th Cir. (July
15, 1971) (unreported).

71-184

Portela v. United States, 40
U.S.L.W. 3079, petition for
cert. filed to review 2d Cir.
(July 7, 1971) (unreported),
cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3220.

Aug. 6, 1971

29. Night of Lust,
a film.

71-190

Aug. 7, 1971

30. Carmen Baby,
a film.

71-247

Hartstein
v.
Missouri,
40
U.S.L.W. 3079, petition for
cert. filed to review Mo. Sup.
Ct. (May 12, 1971) (unreported), rev'd, 40 U.S.L.W.
3278.
Rabe
v.
Washington,
40
U.S.L.W. 3080, petition for
cert. filed to review 79 Wash.
2d 254, 484 P.2d 917 (1971),
cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W.
3194.

31. Motion pictures.

71-265

32. Peep shows.

71-275

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol17/iss3/1

L.W. 3030, docketing appeal
to review 326 F. Supp. 348
(C.D. Cal. 1971), prob. juris.
noted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3287.

Walter v. Slaton, 40 U.S.L.W.
3091, petition for cert. filed to
review 227 Ga. 676, 182 S.E.2d
464 (1971), cert. denied, 40
U.S.L.W. 3288.
Antonello v. San Diego, 40
U.S.L.W. 3091, petition for
cert. filed to review 16 Cal.
App. 3d 161, 93 Cal. Rptr. 820
(Ct. App. 1971), cert. denied,
40 U.S.L.W. 3194.

1971

Dec. 21, 1971
1971

Oct. 12, 1971

Nov. 9, 1971
Aug. 6, 1971

Nov. 9, 1971

Dec. 14, 1971
Aug. 8, 1971

Oct. 26, 1971
Aug. 20, 1971

Dec. 21, 1971
Aug. 23, 1971

Oct. 26, 1971
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Prior
Docket
No.
1970-71 Docket
Term
No.

33. Peep shows.

71-292

Date of Court's
Rulings or
Filings
Ballew v. Robinson, 40 U.S.L.W.
3095, petition for cert. filed to
review 5th Cir. (May 27, 1971)
(unreported), cert. denied, 40
U.S.L.W. 3220.
Byrne v. P.B.I.C., Inc., 40
U.S.L.W. 3095, docketing apeal to review 313 F. Supp.
57 (D. Mass. 1970).

34. Hair,a rock
musical which in
one scene showed
mass fullfront nudity
of four or five
young men and
several girls.
35. Obscene materials
transported in
interstate commerce.

71-304

36. Obscene materials
transported in
interstate commerce.

71-396

37. Affair, Lasses
& Glasses and
Cocktails,
magazines.
38. Heads Up,
Honey Bun and
Tulip Review,
magazines.
39. Obscene films
and motion
pictures.

71-411

71-443

v.
California,
40
Wiener
U.S.L.W. 3134, petition for
cert. filed to review Cal. Super.
Ct. App. (June 30, 1971) (unreported), reV'd, 40 U.S.L.W.
3278.

40. Nude "go-go!'
dancing.

71-475

41. "Girlie" magazines.

71-486

42. Without a
Stitch, a film.

71-515

43. The Teeny
Suckers, a book.

71-523

Hofmannv. Carson, 40 U.S.L.W.
3168, appeal docketed to review 250 So. 2d 891 (Fla.
1971), dismissed for want of
federal question, 40 U.S.L.W.
3264.
Monger v. Florida, 40 U.S.L.W.
3168, petition for cert. filed to
review Fla. Sup. Ct. (June 9,
1971) (unreported).
Art Theatre Guild v. Tennessee,
40 U.S.L.W. 3182, docketing
appeal to review 469 S.W.2d
669 (Tenn. Sup. Ct. 1971).
Wilhoit v. United States, 40
U.S.L.W. 3182, petition for
cert. filed to review D.C. Cir.
(July 13, 1971) (unreported),
cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3279.

71-381

71-437

Alexander v. United States, 40
U.S.L.W. 3108, petition for
cert. filed to review 2d Cir.
(July 7, 1971) (unreported),
cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3220.
Marti v. United States, 40
U.S.L.W. 3124, petition for
cert. filed to review 421 F.2d
1263 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3220.
Court v. Wisconsin, 40 U.S.L.W.
3125, petition for cert. filed to
review 51 Wis. 2d 683, 188
N.W.2d 29 (1971).
Amatov. Wisconsin, 40 U.S.L.W.
3134, petition for cert. filed to
review 49 Wis. 2d 238, 183
N.W. 2d 29 (1971).

Aug. 25, 1971

Nov. 9, 1971
Aug. 30, 1971

Sept. 15, 1971

Nov. 9, 1971
Sept. 17, 1971

Oct. 12, 1971
Sept. 22, 1971

Sept. 27, 1971

Sept. 28, 1971

Dec. 14, 1971
Oct. 1, 1971

Dec. 7, 1971
Oct. 4, 1971

Oct. 9, 1971

Oct. 12, 1971

Dec. 14, 1971
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Docket
No.
1970-71 Docket
Term
No.
44. Licensing
ordinance.

71-577

[VOL. 17: p. 3 9 3

(Continued)

Date of Court's
Case
Municipal Court v. Perrine, 40
U.S.L.W. 3206, petition for
cert. filed to review 5 Cal. 3d
656, 97 Cal. Rptr. 320, 488
P.2d 648 (1971), 5 Cal. 3d
669, 488 P.2d 565, 97 Cal.
Rptr. 328 (1971), cert denied,
40 U.S.L.W. 3335.

Rulings or
Filings

Oct. 26, 1971

Jan. 17, 1972
Oct. 29, 1971

71-599

Motion Picture "Vixen" v. Keating, 40 U.S.L.W. 3221, docketing appeal to review 27 Ohio
St. 2d 278, 272 N.E.2d 137
(1971).

46. Obscene
materials.

71-615

Nov. 3, 1971

47. Sexually
provocative
nude dancing.

71-641

48. No item
mentioned.

71-662

Chapman v. California, 40
U.S.L.W. 3239, petition for
cert. filed to review 17 Cal.
App. 3d 865, 95 Cal. Rptr. 242
(Ct. App. 1971).
California,
40
Escobar
v.
U.S.L.W. 3240, petition for
cert. filed to review Cal.
Super. Ct. (unreported).
Rohm v. California, 40 U.S.L.W.
3250, petition for cert. filed to
review Cal. Super. Ct. (unreported).

49. Obscene book.

71-701

Reitanov. California,40U.S.L.W.
3265, petition for cert. filed to
review Cal. Super. Ct. (unreported).

Nov. 24, 1971

50. The Daisy Chain,
and Kiss Me Quick,
motion pictures, and
previews of The
Secret Sex Lives of
Romeo and Juliet.

71-728

Davison v. Florida, 40 U.S.L.W.
3280, petition for cert. filed to
review 251 So. 2d 841 (Fla.
1971).

Dec. 2, 1971

51. Obscene
publications.

71-739

Village Books, Inc. v. Marshall,
40 U.S.L.W. 3280, petition for
cert. filed to review Md. Ct.
App. (unreported).

Dec. 10, 1971

52, Obscene
newspapers
and magazines,

71-773

Adult Book Store v. Sensenbrenner, 40 U.S.L.W. 3289,
petition for cert. filed to review Ohio Sup. Ct. (unreported).

Dec. 10, 1971

53. No item
mentioned.

71-844

Dec. 29, 1971

54. No item
mentioned.

71-984

Marks v. Newport, 40 U.S.L.W.
3303, petition for cert. filed to
review Ky. Ct. App. (unreported).
Wasserman v. Municipal Court,
40 U.S.L.W. 3369, petition
for cert. filed to review 9th
Cir. (unreported).

45. Vixen, a film.

71
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Nov. 11, 1971

Nov. 12, 1971

Feb. 3, 1972
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